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THE WATER-ENERGY-CLIMATE NEXUS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CENTRAL ASIAN PERSPECTIVE
Anatole Boute*
ABSTRACT
Water, energy, and climate change are intrinsically related to each other but
are nonetheless subject to different international legal regimes. The fragmented
nature of water, energy, and climate governance represents a challenge for the
sustainable management of resources in the energy and water landscape of the
21st century. Regulatory choices in one field can potentially undermine the policy
objectives pursued in the other fields. Promoting conventional and unconventional energy production for energy security purposes increases pressure on the
availability of fresh water resources and contributes to climate change. Climate
change exacerbates the scarcity of water resources, which leads to increasing tensions relating to water access and energy supply in certain regions of the world.
Water- and energy-related tensions are particularly acute in Central Asia.
Because of its large energy reserves and strategic location in the heart of Eurasia,
the Central Asian region is of significant importance for world energy markets. In
addition to fossil energy, Central Asia holds large water resources. However,
energy and water resources are unevenly distributed in the region, which creates a
need for close transboundary cooperation in order to ensure equitable and sustainable access to these vital resources. Despite the mutual benefits of cooperation in
Central Asia, governments are reluctant to rely on their neighbors for their water
and energy security. States’ refusal to cooperate generates high energy, social,
economic, and environmental costs, and poses a serious threat to peace and stability in a region of particular geopolitical relevance. External legal mechanisms are
needed to overcome the present political obstacles to transboundary cooperation in
resources management.
In an effort to overcome the fragmented nature of water, energy, and climate law, this Article examines how international law—in particular the principle of transboundary cooperation—can contribute to addressing the resource
management challenges in Central Asia. Additionally, this analysis aims to contribute to the development of international law on transboundary resources man* Associate Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Faculty of Law) and
Legal Advisor, International Finance Corporation (The World Bank Group). This article
represents the views of the author only—not necessarily the views of the institutions with
which the author is associated. Many thanks to Christina Leb (The World Bank) and Kanat
Botbaev (Energy Charter Secretariat) for comments on a previous draft of this article and to
Anna Harris-Evans and Daria Shapovalova for editorial assistance. All possibly remaining
errors must be attributed to the author only. The research underlying this Article benefited
from financial support by the CUHK Direct Research Grant.
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agement. Based on the Central Asian case study, this Article argues in favor of
an integrated approach to water-energy-climate regulation in order to achieve
water-energy-climate security in a mutually reinforcing way.
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INTRODUCTION
Water and energy are intrinsically related to each other.1 This relationship is illustrated by the increasing controversy surrounding the impact of
shale energy and tar sands on aquifers,2 water use for cooling of thermal
power plants,3 hydropower generation,4 and the energy cost of desalinization.5 These examples highlight the fact that, in the energy and water landscape of the 21st century, energy security and water security can and do
conflict with each other. Increasing energy supply, for example, by exploiting unconventional fossil fuels or generating more thermal power, can create a negative impact on the availability of clean water resources because of
the water intensity of conventional and unconventional energy exploita1.
On official national and international reports highlighting the pressing challenges
characterizing the water-energy nexus, see, for example, U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, THE WATERENERGY NEXUS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 1 (2014), http://energy.gov/downloads/waterenergy-nexus-challenges-and-opportunities; Letter and Concept Note from the President of
the G.A. to all Permanent Missions and Permanent Observer Missions to the U.N. (Mar. 21,
2013), http://www.un.org/en/ga/president/67/letters/pdf/Thematic%20Debate_Sust.Develop
ment%20and%20Climate%20Change%20-%2021%20March%202013.pdf (announcing the
convening of a thematic debate entitled “Sustainable Development and Climate Change:
Practical Solutions in the Energy-Water Nexus,” held at the U.N. Headquarters on May 16,
2013); WORLD ECON. FORUM WATER INITIATIVE, WATER SECURITY: THE WATER-FOOD-ENERGY-CLIMATE NEXUS 44–67 (Dominic Waughray ed., 2011), http://www.weforum.org/reports/watersecurity-water-energy-food-climate-nexus. For examples of recent scholarly publications on
the topic, see Ana Cascão et al., The Role of Energy in Transboundary Water Governance, 3 INT’L
J. WATER GOVERNANCE 1, 1–4 (2015) and Jeremy Allouche, Carl Middleton & Dipak Gyawali,
Technical Veil, Hidden Politics: Interrogating the Power Linkages Behind the Nexus, 8 WATER ALTERNATIVES 610, 610–11 (2015).
2.
See, e.g., Resolution on the Environmental Impacts of Shale Gas and Shale Oil
Extraction Activities, EUR. PARL. DOC. P7_TA(2012)0443 (2012).
3.
See, e.g., Vattenfall AB v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Request for Arbitration, ¶¶ 13–14, 17 (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.italaw.com/documents/VattenfallRequest
forArbitration.pdf (exemplifying a controversy over the impact of coal-fired electricity production on water quality). For a discussion of this claim, see Nathalie Bernasconi, Int’l Inst.
for Sustainable Dev., Background Paper on Vattenfall v. Germany Arbitration (July 2009), http://
www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/background_vattenfall_vs_germany.pdf.
4.
Anur Kumar et al., Hydropower, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(IPCC), SPECIAL REPORT ON RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 437,
462 (Ottmar Edenhofer et al. eds., 2011), http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report.
5.
Menachem Elimelech & William A. Phillip, The Future of Seawater Desalination:
Energy, Technology, and the Environment, 333 SCIENCE 712, 712 (2011).
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tion.6 Increasing water supply, such as through sanitation or desalinization
processes, can negatively affect energy security because of the higher energy
intensity of new water production techniques.7
In the context of climate change, the challenges relating to energy and
water security are becoming more acute. Global warming intensifies relative
water scarcity and increases water needs (e.g., for agricultural irrigation),
thus exacerbating the tensions between energy and water supply.8 Droughts
affect the operational flexibility and productivity of thermal and hydropower plants.9 Increasingly, lower water levels make it politically, socially,
and environmentally unacceptable to divert scarce water resources for the
exploitation of unconventional fossil fuels. At the same time, the necessary
and urgent action to mitigate climate change and adapt to global warming
represents an opportunity to reorganize our energy systems towards becoming more sustainable and water-friendly. Promotion of energy efficiency
and clean energy contributes to reducing the water footprint of the energy
sector.10 Likewise, climate change adaptation—through more efficient water
use—reduces the energy footprint of the water sector.11
Given the transboundary nature of climate change, water supply, and
energy exchanges, international law has a crucial role to play in facilitating
the transition towards sustainable and secure energy and water systems. As
recognized by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC),12 the UN Watercourses Convention,13 and the Energy
Charter Treaty (ECT),14 cooperation between states is vital to achieve the
See, e.g., Resolution on the Environmental Impacts of Shale Gas, supra note 2, ¶¶

R

See Elimelech & Phillip, supra note 5.
Blanca E. Jiménez Cisneros et al., Freshwater Resources, in WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY 229, 248 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014), https://ipcc-wg2
.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-Chap3_FINAL.pdf.
9.
C. B. HARTO & Y. E. YAN, ENVTL. SCI. DIV ., ARGONNE NAT ’L LAB ., ANL/EVS/R-11/
14, ANALYSIS OF DROUGHT IMPACTS ON ELECTRICITY PRODUCTION IN THE WESTERN AND TEXAS INTERCONNECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 10, 40 (2011), http://energy.sandia.gov/wp/wp-content/
gallery/uploads/Drought-Analysis-Report-Final.pdf.
10.
See U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 2.
11.
BEVAN GRIFFITHS-SATTENSPIEL & WENDY WILSON, RIVER NETWORK, THE CARBON FOOTPRINT OF WATER 25 (2009), http://www.rivernetwork.org/resource-library/carbon-footprintwater.
12.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 166 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
13.
G.A. Res. 51/229, annex, United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, pmbl., art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/51/49 (May 21,
1997), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 700 [hereinafter U.N. Watercourses Convention].
14.
Energy Charter Treaty art. 2, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter ECT].

R

6.
18–49.
7.
8.
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objectives of climate, water, and energy security. Joint action contributes to
states’ mutual benefits and interests in the sustainable management of transboundary resources. Moreover, the interrelated nature of the water, energy,
and climate challenges calls for an integrated approach to their international
regulation.15
Despite its central relevance for the management of transboundary resources,16 cooperation—as a principle of law—has received relatively less attention in academic literature than other principles of international law.17
Although studies on cooperation exist in the field of water law,18 few scholars have examined this principle in the fields of energy19 and climate20 law.
More importantly, climate change, water, and energy have been studied as
separate fields of law, following the fragmentation of international law
around the UNFCCC, the UN Watercourses Convention, and the ECT.21
Some scholars have examined the interrelation between international water
and climate law,22 building on the reference in the UNFCCC to water management.23 Moreover, studies exist on the synergies and contradictions between international climate law and energy law, including on the climate
15.
See U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at v (discussing the importance of an “integrated strategic approach” to address water-energy issues).
16.
See, e.g., EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES (James R. Crawford &
John S. Bell eds., 2002) (discussing the relevance and international regulation of collective
action in the management of transboundary resources or “international common pool
resources”).
17.
CHRISTINA L EB , COOPERATION IN THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 3
(James Crawford & John S. Bell eds., 2013) (highlighting the limited scholarly attention on
the duty to cooperate under international water law).
18.
See, e.g., id.
19.
See Anatole Boute, The Good Neighborliness Principle in EU External Energy Relations:
The Case of Energy Transit, in GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS IN THE EUROPEAN L EGAL CONTEXT 354
(Dimitry Kochenov et al. eds., 2015).
20.
See Int’l Law Ass’n [ILA], Res. 2/2014, Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to
Climate Change draft art. 8, at 6 (Apr. 11, 2014), http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.
cfm/cid/1029.
21.
On “policy fragmentation” in the field of water, energy, and climate management,
see Karen Hussey & Jamie Pittock, The Energy-Water Nexus: Managing the Links Between
Energy and Water for a Sustainable Future, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 31 (2012). On the “fragmented
body” of international law governing climate change, see Cinnamon Carlarne, Delinking International Environmental Law & Climate Change, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN . L. 1, 10, 18
(2014); Margaret Young, Climate Change Law and Regime Interaction, 5 CARBON & CLIMATE L.
REV. 147 (2011).
22.
See, e.g., Flavia Rocha Loures et al., Convention on Climate Change, in THE UN
WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER MANAGEMENT 207–20 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 2013).
23.
See UNFCCC, supra note 12, at art. 4, ¶ 1(e), 1771 U.N.T.S. at 171.

R
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change-related provisions of the ECT.24 However, the interaction between
the fields of international energy and water law—and to an even greater
extent, the relation between the fields of international climate, water, and
energy law—has been largely ignored in the literature.
The fragmented approach to the study of water, energy, and climate law
must be criticized because it fails to capture the high degree of interdependence between these legal regimes.25 Regulatory choices in one of these
fields of law can reinforce the objectives pursued by the other fields.26 If
poorly managed, however, regime interaction can result in contradictions
(i.e., conflicts of laws).27 In particular, the fragmented analysis of water,
energy, and climate law does not make it possible to fully “[e]xploit the
productive synergies among water and energy systems.”28 Similarly, limited
focus on transboundary cooperation fails to capture the high degree of interdependence resulting from the uneven distribution of water and energy
resources between countries. Given the increasing challenges that climate
change poses for energy and water systems,29 it is necessary to reflect on
the creation of legal mechanisms that attempt to achieve the synergies
presented by the integrated management of resources.
This Article aims to contribute to the international law literature by
proposing a legal analysis of transboundary cooperation in the field of
water, energy, and climate management. The objective is to test the extent
to which existing treaties governing international water, energy, and climate
regimes offer adequate solutions to address the obstacles to transboundary
cooperation. Does international water, energy, and climate law facilitate the
achievement of the mutual environmental, social, and economic benefits
that characterize the integrated and transboundary management of water
and energy resources?
24.
Adrian Bradbrook, Significance of the Energy Charter Treaty, 64 APPLIED ENERGY 251
(1999). But see PETER D. CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW: THE PURSUIT OF
STABILITY 203 (2010) (arguing that “[t]he ECT is . . . almost explicitly not an environmental
treaty”).
25.
Margaret Young, Introduction: The Productive Friction Between Regimes, in REGIME
INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 1 (Margaret A. Young ed., 2015)
(“[T]here is an urgent need for international lawyers to understand how different branches of
norms and institutions overlap on issues of global concern.”).
26.
See Young, supra note 21, at 153 (highlighting that “[r]egime interaction across the
various stages of law-making, implementation and adjudication is mutually reinforcing”).
27.
See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
28.
U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 4.
29.
See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM WATER INITIATIVE, supra note 1; Jiménez Cisneros et al.,
supra note 8.

R
R
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To answer this question, this Article will restrict itself to a case study of
Central Asia, which is a region of high strategic importance for world energy markets30 that faces huge challenges regarding the management of
water resources in the context of climate change.31 The upper riparian (or
upstream) countries of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan32 are endowed with large
water resources, but have limited access to reserves of oil, gas, and other
natural resources.33 The lower riparian (or downstream) countries of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are endowed with considerable fossil fuel reserves but are dependent on water supply from the upper riparian
countries.34 During Soviet times, water and energy supply in Central Asia
was organized in a centralized way to overcome the uneven distribution of
resources in the region.35 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in a
climate of increasing mutual distrust, the Central Asian states started to

30.
See, e.g., Onur Cobanli, Central Asian Gas in Eurasian Power Game, 68 ENERGY POL’Y
348 (2014); ALEXANDROS PETERSEN & KATINKA BARYSCH, CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM, RUSSIA,
CHINA AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY IN CENTRAL ASIA (2011), http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/report/2011/russia-china-and-geopolitics-energy-central-asia.
31.
See, e.g., Bakhtiyor Mukhammadiev, Challenges of Transboundary Water Resources
Management in Central Asia, in THE ARAL SEA: THE DEVASTATION AND PARTIAL REHABILITATION OF A
GREAT LAKE 233 (Philip Micklin et al. eds., 2014); Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman, Principles
of Transboundary Water Resources Management and Water-Related Agreements in Central Asia: An
Analysis, 28 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 475 (2012); Philip Micklin, Water in the Aral Sea
Basin of Central Asia: Cause of Conflict or Cooperation?, 43 EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 505,
522–23 (2002); Int’l Crisis Grp. [ICG], Central Asia: Water and Conflict, at ii, ICG Asia Rep.
No. 34 (May 30, 2002), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/034-centralasia-water-and-conflict [hereinafter ICG, Central Asia]; ICG, Water Pressures in Central Asia,
ICG Europe and Central Asia Rep. No. 233 (2014), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/
Files/europe/central-asia/233-water-pressures-in-central-asia.pdf.
32.
Afghanistan equally is an upstream riparian of the Amu Darya, but not considered
here because the focus of this article is on former Soviet Central Asia. See infra Section I.A.
33.
Murodbek Laldjebaev, The Water-Energy Puzzle in Central Asia: The Tajikistan Perspective, 26 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES DEV. 25 (2010). See generally Shavkat Ismailov, Energeticheskoe Zakonodatel’stvo Tadzhikistana i osnovnye napravleniia ego
sovershenstvovaniia, [Energy Legislation of Tajikistan and the Main Directions of its Improvement], ENERGETICHESKOE PRAVO (2009).
34.
Sanat Kushkumbayev & Azina Kushkumbayeva, Water and Energy Issues in the Context of International and Political Disputes in Central Asia, 12 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 211 (2013). See
generally H.O. Arifov & P.Kh. Arifova, Osvoenie gidroenergeticheskikh resursov Tadzkhikistana i
nekotorye pravovye voprosy vodopol’zovaniia v baseyne Arala [The Development of Hydropower
Resources of Tajikistan and Some of the Legal Issues of Water Use in the Basin of the Aral
Sea], ENERGETICHESKOE PRAVO (2009); Shavkat Ismailov, Ratsional’noe ispol’zovanie vodnoenergeticheskikh resursov regiona: Pravovie aspekty [Rational Use of Water and Energy Resources of
the Region: The Legal Aspects], ENERGETICHESKOE PRAVO (2011).
35.
Energetika Rossii 1920–2020, at 5 (Vladimir Bushuev ed., 2006).
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prioritize national water and energy independence.36 National-centered (or
state-centered) approaches to the organization of water and energy management generated acute challenges for water and energy security and increased the carbon intensity of the Central Asian energy system.37 Energy
and water policy experts generally agree that regional cooperation and integrated management of resources is necessary to ensure the effective use of
energy and water resources in Central Asia.38 More specifically, the sustainable management of resources in the region depends on the supply of fossil
fuels by the lower riparian countries to the upper riparian countries to compensate for the storage and supply of water for agricultural purposes.39
Taking into account the explicit benefits of water-energy cooperation in
the region and the obstacles to the realization of this approach, Central Asia
provides a particularly relevant case study to assess the effectiveness of international law in facilitating the transboundary and integrated management
of resources. Can international water, energy, and climate law help overcome obstacles to inter-state cooperation in Central Asia and so ensure the
sustainable management of resources in the region?
36.
See World Bank, Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia: Improving Regional Cooperation
in the Syr Darya Basin, at 19, World Bank Rep. No. 33878 (2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTUZBEKISTAN/Resources/Water_Energy_Nexus_final.pdf.
37.
Siegfried Grunwald, Asian Dev. Bank, Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation:
Power Sector Regional Master Plan, at 2-6, 2-7, ADB Doc. 4864P14/FICHT-8865248-v9
(2012), http://www.adb.org/projects/documents/central-asia-regional-economic-cooperationpower-sector-regional-master-plan-tacr.
38.
See Protocol of the Workshop for the Representatives of Water and Energy Authorities of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the
Republic of Uzbekistan Related to Water and Energy Use Issues in the Forthcoming 1998/9
Fall-Winter Season and 1999 Vegetation Period, Aug. 24–26, 1998, http://
www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/Annual-Protocol-99.pdf [hereinafter Protocol of the Workshop]; Makhmud Kh. Khamidov, Characteristic Features of Integrated
Water Resources Management in the Syrdarya River Basin, in IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA 28–29 (Patricia Wouters et al. eds., 2007); Daene
McKinney, Cooperative Management of Transboundary Water Resources in Central Asia, in IN THE
TRACKS OF TAMERLANE: CENTRAL ASIA’S PATH INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 205 (Dan Burghart & Theresa Sabonis-Helf eds., 2003); Pöyry Energy Ltd., ESIA Report (Final) Volume I: Text, at 321,
Ref. No. 9A000304.01 (2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/brief/finalreports-related-to-the-proposed-rogun-hpp. See generally Shavkat Ismailov, Nekotorye osobennosti energeticheskogo prava v Tadzhikistany [Some Features of the Energy Law in Tajikistan], 2
ENERGETICHESKOE PRAVO (2009) (discussing the need for Tajikistan’s cooperation with other
states and international organizations); G.B. Koshlakov & B.S. Sirodzhev, Energeticheskaia
programma Tadzhikistana v sisteme energoobespecheniia stran Tsentral’noi Asii [Energy Program in
Tajikistan in the Energy Supply of Central Asian Countries], ENERGETICHESKOE PRAVO (2009) (discussing the importance of cooperation between Central Asian states on managing resources).
39.
Protocol of the Workshop, supra note 38; Khamidov, supra note 38, at 29; McKinney, supra note 38, at 20.
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Because “cooperation as such has no inherent value,”40 the analysis of
joint water, energy, and climate management under international law depends on a clear understanding of the goals that can be achieved with this
approach.41 Similarly, it is necessary to clearly understand the obstacles that
prevent cooperation in order to examine the possible contribution that international law could make to facilitate the transboundary management of
resources. On this basis, this Article begins by introducing the benefits of
integrated water, energy, and climate management in Central Asia (Part I)
and outlining the obstacles that currently hinder their realization (Part II).
Building upon this analysis of the water-energy-climate nexus in Central
Asia, the subsequent sections of this Article look at the duty to cooperate
under general international law (Part III) before turning to cooperation—
more precisely transboundary resource management—under international
water law, climate law, and energy law (Part IV).
This Article argues that international law imposes on states a clear obligation to cooperate in good faith in the resolution of water-energy disputes.
The principle of “good neighborly relations” requires states to exercise a
particular duty of care when deciding to reduce or interrupt the cross-border supply of energy and water. International water law reinforces the general duty to cooperate and avoid harm by requiring states to ensure the
optimal utilization of transboundary water resources. Contrary to the general assumption in current water law literature,42 this case study of Central
Asia demonstrates that the optimal utilization of transboundary water resources does not depend solely on the actions of the water-rich nations. In
Central Asia, the energy-rich lower riparian countries can avoid the unsustainable use of hydropower by supplying fossil fuel or thermal power to the
upper riparian countries.43
The international climate, energy, and water regimes are still actively
being developed, thus providing opportunities for the integration of new
principles and obligations. Analyzing the interaction44 of climate, energy,
40.
Rüdiger Wolfrum, International Law of Cooperation, in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 193 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1986); see also Rüdiger Wolfrum, International
Law of Cooperation, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 783 (2012).
41.
See Jost Delbrück, The International Obligation to Cooperate – An Empty Shell or a
Hard Law Principle of International Law? – A Critical Look at a Much Debated Paradigm of
Modern International Law, in 1 COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY 5, 9 (Holger Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2012) (arguing that “the meaning of the concept of cooperation depends
on the goals that cooperation is to achieve”).
42.
But see STEPHEN MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 278 (2007).
43.
Protocol of the Workshop, supra note 38; Khamidov, supra note 38, at 29; McKinney, supra note 38, at 20.
44.
See Margaret Young, Regime Interaction in Creating, Implementing and Enforcing International Law, in REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 85 (Mar-
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and water law in relation to the specific resource management challenges in
Central Asia offers useful lessons on the gaps and mutually reinforcing nature of these fields of law. As will be argued below, cooperation under international climate and energy law, for example, is much weaker—i.e., less
legally binding—than under international water law.45 At the same time,
international climate and energy law provides stronger tools to ensure the
implementation and enforcement of transboundary resource management
mechanisms.46 This Article argues that international climate and energy law
would benefit from stronger cooperation requirements, such as by incorporating similar cooperation clauses to international water law. International
water law would benefit from a stronger enforcement regime by reflecting
the verification regime under international climate law and the investment
protection regime under international energy law.
An important limitation of the present Article is that it does not examine international law relating to the agricultural sector, despite the obvious water-energy-climate-agriculture (food) nexus.47 Agriculture is the
largest water-consuming sector in Central Asia and thus one of the main
contributing factors to current water tensions in the region.48 These agriculture-related tensions are likely to increase in the context of climate
change.49 In addition to the clear links to water management and climate
change, agriculture is closely related to the energy sector. Water releases for
hydropower generation in the winter influence the availability of water resources for agricultural irrigation in the summer. Moreover, subsidized electricity prices stimulate the increased use of irrigation pumping, thereby
exacerbating the problem of water scarcity in the region.50 By excluding the
international law relating to the agricultural sector from the scope of this
analysis, this Article thus omits an important part of the water-energy-climate interaction. However, international legal questions relating to the agricultural sector include a wide range of issues such as the legality of
garet Young ed., 2015) (arguing that the study of regime interaction can help create,
implement, and enforce international law).
45.
See infra Sections IV.B.-C
46.
See id.
47.
On the “energy-water-land” nexus, see U.S. DEP ’T OF ENERGY, supra note 1, at 2. On
the “water-food-energy-climate” nexus, see WORLD ECON. FORUM WATER INITIATIVE, supra note
1.
48.
Olli Varis, Curb Vast Water Use in Central Asia, 514 NATURE 27 (2014).
49.
Id. at 27–28.
50.
Shanta Devarajan et al., World Bank, MENA Economic Monitor: Corrosive Subsidies,
at 18, World Bank Rep. No. 91210 (2014), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2014/
10/20272046/mena-economic-monitor-corrosive-subsidies; see also Adel Al-Weshali, Diesel
Subsidies and Yemen Politics: Post-2011 Crises and Their Impact on Groundwater Use and Agriculture, 8 WATER ALTERNATIVES 215 (2015).

R
R
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agricultural subsidies under international trade law51 that cannot realistically
be treated within the scope of this work.

I. BENEFITS OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER-ENERGYCLIMATE MANAGEMENT
A. The Origins of Transboundary and Integrated Resources
Management in Central Asia
Transboundary and integrated water and energy management in Central Asia stems from Soviet times. According to the Soviet principle of centralized planning,52 energy (electricity) and water supply in Central Asia
was organized in the 1960s on a unified basis, in an effort to optimize exploitation of natural resources.53 The centralized approach meant that the
region’s electricity system—the Central Asian Power System—was organized without regard to the borders that now separate the different states in
Central Asia.54 Instead, regional electricity supply was based on the availability of natural resources during the different periods of the year.55 Hydropower plants were built in what now corresponds to Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan.56 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the upper riparian countries to
the Syr Darya and Amu Darya rivers—the two main transboundary watercourses in Central Asia—and thus have a very large potential for hydropower generation.57 Thermal power plants were built in what is now
51.
See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss & Lydia Slobodian, Virtual Water, Water Scarcity, and
International Trade Law, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 717 (2014) (discussing the water-agriculture
nexus under international trade law).
52.
See NICOLAS SPULBER, RUSSIA’S ECONOMIC TRANSITIONS: FROM LATE TSARISM TO THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 201 (2003); ANATOLE BOUTE, RUSSIAN ELECTRICITY AND ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW
74–111 (2015); Anatole Boute, Modernizing the Russian District Heating Sector: Financing Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Investments Under the New Federal Heat Law, 29 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 746 (2012).
53.
The centralized approach to the organization of the electricity system was first
established in the 1920 plan for the electrification of Russia developed by the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia and adopted at the VIII All Russian Convention of the
Soviets of Dec. 1920. On this so-called “GOELRO plan,” see Energetika Rossii, supra note
35, at 5.
54.
Mercados EMI, World Bank, Load Dispatch and System Operation Study for Central
Asian Power System, at 5 (2010), http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/events/2010/SOMOct/Diagnostic-Study-CAREC-Energy-Strategy-Pillar2-Full-Report.pdf.
55.
Vladimir Yasinskiy et al., Energy Security and Water Resources Management in Transboundary River Basins in Central Asia, 2013 EDB EURASIAN INTEGRATION Y.B. 168, 177 (2013),
http://www.eabr.org/general//upload/CII%20-%20izdania/YearBook-2013/
a_n6_2013_full%20version.pdf.
56.
Grunwald, supra note 37, at 2-6, 2-7; see also Arifov & Arifova, supra note 34.
57.
World Bank, Central Asia Energy-Water Development Program, EUROPE AND CENTRAL
ASIA, http://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/brief/caewdp (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
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Uzbekistan, (South) Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan as a result of the large
fossil fuel reserves that these countries possess (gas in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and coal in Kazakhstan).58
The unified approach to energy and water supply provided the benefit
of making the best use of the hydropower potential of the upper riparian
countries and the coal and natural gas resource base of the lower riparian
countries.59 The complementarity of the Central Asian fuel mix could be
exploited through the construction of a high voltage (500 kilovolt) transmission network interconnecting the different Central Asian states to each
other.60 In the absence of consideration of national borders, the regional
energy network created a situation of particularly high energy interdependence between the Central Asian countries.
Besides energy supply benefits, the centralized approach to electricity
supply in Central Asia played an important role in relation to the management of water resources in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. In
particular, the development of the Kyrgyz and Tajik hydropower potential
was closely related to the intensive development of the predominantly cotton agricultural sector in the lower riparian countries—agricultural development that eventually led to the well-publicized environmental disaster of
the Aral Sea.61 Large hydro dams and reservoirs, the Toktogul in Kyrgyzstan and Nurek in Tajikistan, were designed during Soviet times primarily

58.
Grunwald, supra note 37, at 2-6, 2-7; Artur Kochnakyan et al., World Bank, Uzbekistan Energy/Power Sector Issues Note, at 37, World Bank Rep. No. ACS4146 (2013), http://
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/01/31/0003
33037_20140131162043/Rendered/PDF/ACS41460WP0Box0Issues0Note00PUBLIC0.pdf.
59.
See, e.g., Yasinskiy et al., supra note 55, at 177 (highlighting the technical and economic benefits that the proper functioning of the Central Asia Power System represents for
all Central Asian countries).
60.
Sergei Rokotian, Osnovnye problemy sozdaniia elektricheskikh setei 500 kV v SSSR
[Main problems with developing 500kV electricity networks in the USSR], in ENERGOSET’PROEKT [ENERGY NETWORK PROJECT]– 40 LET ESP 1962–2002, at 7 (Igor’ Iakimtets ed.,
2002).
61.
On the environmental problems affecting the Aral Sea, see, for example, THE ARAL
SEA: THE DEVASTATION AND PARTIAL REHABILITATION OF A GREAT LAKE (Philip Micklin et al. eds.,
2014). The water intensity of this agricultural development—more than the construction of
the hydropower plants—caused the destruction of the Aral Sea by using the water destined to
the Sea. Id. at 171. In contrast to hydropower plants, irrigation is a consumptive use of water,
with limited return flow: only a small fraction of the water pumped from the river will
return to it. See id. at 111, 171. However, it is essential to note that the operation of hydropower plants in the winter can have an important distortive impact on the equilibrium of the
river basins. Because of ice, water released in the winter often does not reach the Aral Sea—a
phenomenon that became particularly problematic in the post-Soviet context of the nationally-centered organization of electricity supply. See id. at 234–35, 237.
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for irrigation purposes.62 The main purpose of this infastructure was to
store water during the non-growing period (October–April) and thereby
secure water availability during the growing period (April–October).63 Besides this seasonal flow regulation, the reservoirs were needed for multiyear regulation of the river basin, particularly to secure the availability of
water during dry years by accumulating water during wet years.64
Given the primary focus on irrigation, water releases from the large
reservoirs during Soviet times were coordinated with the agricultural cycle,
i.e., the vegetation or growing period.65 Hydropower generation was thus a
by-product of the release of water for agricultural (irrigation) purposes.66
Hydropower generation also played a role in ensuring regional energy security. It enabled the Soviet planners to save fossil fuels by reducing the
need for thermal energy production in the lower riparian countries in the
summer.67 Although not a priority for the Soviet planners, the reduced use
of thermal energy also limited the greenhouse gas emissions of the Central
Asian energy sector.
The centralized management of water and energy resources in Central
Asia depended on close cooperation between the upper and lower riparian
parts of the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. In order to secure
sufficient water levels in the upstream reservoirs for summer irrigation purposes, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had to refrain from producing electricity
from hydropower in the winter—when energy is most needed in these cold
climates.68 Following a barter-type arrangement, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan,
and Turkmenistan supplied thermal energy and fossil fuels to Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan in compensation for not using hydropower in the winter.69
Refraining from hydropower generation in the winter positively impacted
the management of water resources in Central Asia. It not only improved
water availability when it was most needed (i.e., in the summer for irriga62.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 1–2; Mavlon Kazakov, History of Rogun and Water and
Energy Relations in Central Asia, AVESTA TJ (Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.avesta.tj/eng/rogun/
1142-history-of-rogun-and-water-and-energy-relations-in-central-asia.html.
63.
Dushen M. Mamatkanov, Mechanisms for Improvement of Transboundary Water Resources Management in Central Asia, in TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES: A FOUNDATION FOR
REGIONAL STABILITY IN CENTRAL ASIA 151 (John E. Moerlins et al. eds., 2008); Laldjebaev, supra
note 33, at 24.
64.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 2.
65.
Mamatkanov, supra note 63.
66.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 1–4.
67.
Kochnakyan et al., supra note 58.
68.
Khamidov, supra note 38, at 26.
69.
Laldjebaev, supra note 33, at 23–25.
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tion purposes), but also limited the damage that would have been caused by
floods in case of water releases during the winter.70

B. Energy Independence in the Post-Soviet Context
The newly-gained independence of the Central Asian countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union represented an important challenge for
the continued implementation of this barter scheme. In order to maintain
the transboundary and integrated management of energy and water supply
in the region, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan71 concluded regional agreements72 that formalized the barterbased scheme that existed during Soviet times.73 According to these arrangements, the lower riparian countries committed to purchasing the hydropower associated with the release of water.74 Moreover, in exchange for
summer water releases, the lower riparian countries agreed to compensate
the upper riparian countries with an “equivalent amount” of exports of thermal power and fossil fuels in the winter.75
For the Syr Darya river basin, this meant in practice that Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan covered Kyrgyzstan’s winter energy deficit in exchange for
its agreement to keep a certain volume of water in the Toktogul reservoir
for water consumption and hydropower in the summer.76 The scheme depended on the determination of specific water and energy volumes on a
70.
Mukhammadiev, supra note 31, at 237.
71.
Afghanistan—although a riparian country of the Amu Darya—is not a party to
these agreements.
72.
See CAWaterinfo, Intergovernmental Agreements of Central Asia States, LIBRARY, http:/
/www.cawater-info.net/library/ca_e.htm (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); see also Univ. Austin
Tex., Framework Agreements, CENTRAL ASIA REGIONAL WATER, ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY AGREEMENTS, http://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/central_asia_regional_water
.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2015). On water regulation in the region, see for example Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes, The Aral Sea Basin: Legal and Institutional Aspects of Governance, in
THE MULTI-GOVERNANCE OF WATER: FOUR CASE STUDIES (Mathias Finger et al. eds., 2006).
73.
See World Bank, supra note 36, app. 4 at 29 (reciting article IV from the 1998
Agreement on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin: “The NarynSyr Darya excess power emanating from the release mode utilized on the Naryn-Syr Darya
during the growing season, and the Toktogul multi-year regulated flows that exceed the
needs of the Kyrgyz Republic, will be transferred to the republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in equal portions. Compensation shall be made in equivalent amounts of energy resources, such as coal, gas, electricity and fuel oil, and the rendering of other types of
products (labor, services), or in monetary terms as agreed upon, for annual and multi-year
water irrigation storage in the reservoirs. A single tariff policy for all types of energy resources and their transportation shall be applied for mutual settlements.”).
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 8–11.
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yearly basis by the parties.77 To facilitate this politically sensitive water allocation process, the Central Asian countries created an international body in
charge of water management in the region: the Interstate Commission for
Water Coordination of Central Asia.78 With technical assistance from the
Amu Darya79 and Syr Darya80 Basin Water Associations, the Interstate
Commission for Water Coordination now determines limits for the use of
water by each country.81
In practice, the implementation of the water and energy agreements
proved to be problematic. Central Asia gradually moved from a centralized,
regional electricity market approach to a national-centered approach, with
national energy independence forming a key political objective.82 Regional
energy trade has dropped ninety percent since the early 2000s.83 This has
led to inefficiencies (higher energy and thus carbon intensity, resulting in
77.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan on
Joint and Complex Use Water and Energy Resources of the Naryn Syr Darya Cascade Reservoirs, Mar. 17, 1998, http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/An
nual-Operation-98.pdf [hereinafter Joint and Complex Use of Naryn Syr Darya Cascade
Reservoirs Agreement]; see also Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Kazakhstan and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on Comprehensive Use of Water
and Energy Resources of the Naryn Syr Darya Cascade Reservoirs, May 23, 2000, http://
www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/Annual-KzKg-00.pdf; Agreement
Between the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on Cooperation in the Area of Rational Water and Energy Uses, Jan. 14,
2000, http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/Kayrakum-00.pdf.
78.
See Agreement Between the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan,
the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Republic of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan On Cooperation in
the Field of Joint Water Resources Management and Conservation of Interstate Sources arts.
7, 9, Feb. 18, 1992, http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/icwcFeb18-1992.pdf.
79.
See Statute of the Basin Water Association “Amudarya,” Apr. 1992, http://www.
icwc-aral.uz/statute9.htm.
80.
See Statute of the Basin Water Association “Syrdarya,” Apr. 1992, http://www.icwcaral.uz/statute10.htm.
81.
See Statute of the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination of Central Asia,
Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute4.htm.
82.
See Anatole Boute, Energy Charter Secretariat, Towards Secure and Sustainable Energy Supply in Central Asia: Electricity Market Reform and Investment Protection 9 (2015), http://
www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/investment/investment-thematic-reports/towards-secure-and-sustainable-energy-supply-in-central-asia-electricity-market-reform-and-invest
ment-protection/; see also Shavkat Ismailov, Ekonomiko-pravovoe obespechenie razvitiia energetiki v Tadzhikistane [Economic and Legal Security of Energy Development in Tajikistan], ENERGETICHESKOE PRAVO (2009); N.K. Kaiumov, Energeticheskaia bezopasnost’ Tadzhikistana v usloviiakh
novykh vyzovov i ugroz [Energy Security of Tajikistan in the Face of New Challenges and Threats],
ENERGETICHESKOE PRAVO (2009).
83.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 4–5.
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higher cost of supply) and threats to the security and reliability of electricity supply, in particular in the upper riparian countries.
The 2009 Tajik winter energy crisis highlighted the gravity of the situation.84 During the particularly harsh conditions of the 2008–2009 winter,
the Central Asian countries had to disconnect from the centralized network
to maintain the stability of the system following excessive offtake (demand)
from the centralized grid.85 As a result, Tajikistan was forced to expose its
populations to significant interruptions in energy supply.86 Following the
stabilization of electricity supply, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan
decided to re-join the centralized system.87 Turkmenistan and Tajikistan
remained disconnected from the Central Asia Power System, creating acute
energy challenges for Tajikistan.88 In addition to internal energy supply
issues, disconnection seriously affected the management of water resources.
Tajikistan, for instance, was forced to release water from its reservoirs without producing electricity.89 According to the World Bank, this waste—or
spillage—of water in Tajikistan was equivalent to a loss of about “3 terawatt
hour of electricity . . . at Nurek in summer.”90
The energy and water security challenges witnessed in the post-Soviet
context largely relate to obstacles in regional cooperation.91 In contrast to
the centralized and integrated approach to energy and water supply during
Soviet times, the lower and upper riparian countries now struggle to agree
on the terms of winter-summer energy exchanges.92 This seriously affects
the capacity of the upper riparian countries to meet their winter energy
84.
See Daryl Fields et al., World Bank, Tajikistan’s Winter Energy Crisis: Electricity Supply and Demand Alternatives, at 4 (2013), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/TAJ_winter_energy_27112012_Eng.pdf.
85.
Id. at 70 (“[I]n the context of an unusually cold winter it was reported that TAJ
[Tajikistan], KYR [Kyrgyzstan] and UZB [Uzbekistan] drew excessive power from the regional grid far beyond what they were entitled to draw, jeopardizing the stability of the
North-South 500 kV Kazakh link and creating serious supply shortages in South Kazakhstan.
KAZ [Kazakhstan] immediately withdrew from CAPS [Central Asia Power System], followed by UZB which also withdrew from CAPS. Subsequently KAZ and KYR and UZB rejoined CAPS, largely because of the intricate water energy linkages in the Syr Darya basin
and practically interwoven nature of the KYR and UZB systems. But TAJ became fully
isolated from CAPS and its import from TRK [Turkmenistan] could no longer take place.”).
86.
See id.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
See Aigul Absametova, Integration Processes in the Electric Power Sectors of the EDB
Member States, 2013 EDB EURASIAN INTEGRATION Y.B. 186, 209 (2012); Yasinskiy et al., supra
note 55, at 177.
92.
See Yasinskiy et al., supra note 55, at 177.
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deficit, and contributes to severe energy security crises in the importing
countries. Kazakhstan still supplies thermal power and fossil fuels to
Kyrgyzstan, and a certain amount of Uzbek power still flows through the
interconnected Kyrgyz grid.93 However, over the last five years, Uzbekistan
interrupted the supply of natural gas to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.94 Moreover, in 2009, Uzbekistan interrupted and refused to reauthorize the transit
of Turkmen power to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan through its electricity
network.95
The absence of cooperation results in the inefficient use of fossil fuels
in the lower riparian countries: in the summer, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan burn natural gas and coal for electricity production—fossil
fuels that could be saved through importations of hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.96 The absence of cooperation also negatively impacts
water use in the region: in order to meet peak winter electricity demand,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan increasingly rely on hydropower generation instead of using thermal power or combined heat and power.97 Maximizing
the production of hydroelectricity generation became the priority over securing the availability of water for irrigation.98 This created tensions in the
region due to the crucial importance of agriculture (particularly cotton) for
the lower riparian countries (principally Uzbekistan).99

C. Mutual Benefits of Cooperation
Most studies on water and energy policy in Central Asia agree that it is
essential for the Central Asian states to reinitiate transboundary water-en93.
The Kazakh, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz grids remain interconnected to each other. Fields
et al., supra note 84, at 70.
94.
Bruce Pannier, Gazprom Works to Advance Russia’s Interests in Central Asia, EUROPEAN
ENERGY REV. (Ned.) (Oct. 20, 2008), http://europeanenergyreview.com/site/pagina.php
?id=355; Ashley Cleek, Uzbekistan to Cut Tajikistan-Bound Gas, EURASIANET.ORG (Mar. 26,
2012), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65180; David Trilling, Two Months Since Gas Cut,
Kyrgyz Losing Patience with Gazprom, EURASIANET.ORG (June 9, 2014), http://www.eurasia
net.org/node/68481.
95.
On negotiations between Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan on the export of Turkmen
power to address the Kyrgyz winter energy deficit and transit obstacles to this deal, see
Tavus Rejepova, Kyrgyzstan Expects Electricity Import from Turkmenistan to Address Its Power
Deficit, THE CENT. ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.cacianalyst.org/publi
cations/field-reports/item/13106-kyrgyzstan-expects-electricity-import-from-turkmenistan-to
-address-its-power-deficit.html; see also Kyrgyzstan Pins Hopes on Cheap Turkmen Power, EURASIANET.ORG (2015), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/74531.
96.
Kochnakyan et al., supra note 58, at 37.
97.
Maksud Bekchanov et al., How Would the Rogun Dam Affect Water and Energy Scarcity in Central Asia?, 40 WATER INT’L 856 (2015).
98.
See World Bank, supra note 36, at 4–5.
99.
See ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at 14.
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ergy cooperation in order to ensure the sustainable management of resources in the region.100 Studies commissioned by the Asian Development
Bank (ADB), for example, highlight how regional cooperation can generate
primary energy savings, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and improve access to water in the region.101
First, cooperation limits the consumption of fossil fuels—mainly natural
gas and coal—in the Central Asian electricity sector.102 By importing hydropower during the summer, the lower riparian countries can reduce the production of electricity from thermal sources. According to ADB studies, this
approach could enable the lower riparian countries to take low-efficiency
power plants out of service and postpone the construction of additional
thermal capacity.103 Exchanging fossil fuels for hydropower would also improve the efficiency of the energy system of the upper riparian countries. In
particular, compensatory supplies of fossil fuels could be used to produce
heat (combined heat and power generation) during the winter. This would
enable Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to reduce their current reliance on electricity for heat supply—a highly energy-inefficient method of generating
heat.104
Paradoxically, Uzbekistan, the Central Asian country that most harshly
opposes regional cooperation in the energy and water sectors, would benefit
the most from summer hydropower imports from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In its 2013 analysis of the Uzbek power sector, the World Bank confirmed the benefits of regional cooperation for the Uzbek electricity system
by highlighting that “coordinated and optimized seasonal power trade with
hydro-rich neighbors could avoid the need for the construction of 500 megawatts of generation capacity in Uzbekistan,” generating cost savings of
around $700 million.105 More generally, coordinating electricity supply with
neighboring countries generates cost savings because the participating countries can share backup capacity, thereby reducing the need for reserve capacity in the individual systems.106
100.
See sources cited supra note 37; see also Koshlakov & Sirodzhev, supra note 38.
101.
Grunwald, supra note 37, at 2-6, 2-7.
102.
Id. at 2-21.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Kochnakyan et al., supra note 58, at 37; see also World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on Proposed Grants for a Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project 2
(CASA-1000), World Bank Rep. No. 83250-SAS (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www-wds.worldbank
.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/03/12/000442464_20140312095
302/Rendered/INDEX/832500PAD0P145010Box382156B00OUO090.txt.
106.
See, e.g., Grunwald, supra note 37, at 2-6.

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA202.txt

Spring 2016]

unknown

Seq: 19

The Water-Energy-Climate Nexus Under International Law

18-MAY-16

13:27

389

Besides energy- and cost-saving benefits, regional energy and water cooperation can reduce the carbon intensity of the Central-Asian energy sector. By reducing the use of the most inefficient thermal plants in the
summer, imports of hydropower have the potential to generate important
greenhouse gas emission savings in the lower riparian countries.107 Similarly, by making it possible for the upper riparian countries to replace inefficient electric heating with district heating and combined heat and power
generation, hydropower-fossil fuel swaps will contribute to climate change
mitigation.108 Because of the complementarity of summer hydropower generation and winter thermal energy production, transboundary electricity
management in Central Asia represents a “low hanging fruit” in terms of
greenhouse gas emission reductions.
Third, cooperation can reduce water spillage (water losses) resulting
from winter hydropower generation in the upper riparian countries. This
will help conserve water resources in Central Asia, an issue of increasing
importance in the context of climate change and its impact on water security. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts
“with high confidence” that melting glaciers will intensify water scarcity
during the dry season.109 In Central Asia, melting glaciers will negatively
affect water levels of upstream multi-year reservoirs.110 At the same time,
the IPCC predicts that climate change will increase water demand in the
agricultural sector.111 In the context of climate change, high interdependence between the riparian countries exacerbates the impact of individual
water management decisions and the resulting uncertainty for the availability of water resources in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya basins.112 By optimizing the utilization of shared water resources in the two river basins,
transboundary electricity management can improve the ability of the Central Asian countries to respond and adapt to the impact of climate change
on future water availability.113 Electricity cooperation in Central Asia thus
107.
See World Bank, supra note 36.
108.
Grunwald, supra note 37, at 2-21.
109.
See, e.g., Jiménez Cisneros et al., supra note 8, at 235.
110.
Pöyry Energy Ltd., supra note 38, at 67.
111.
Jiménez Cisneros et al., supra note 8, at 251.
112.
More generally, on the increased challenges that climate change represents for riparian states, see Rocha Loures et al., supra note 22, at 210.
113.
According to L EB , supra note 17, at 223, in transboundary water systems, regional
cooperation in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change is essential because
“unilateral adaptation measures of individual States may not be of adequate scale or may give
rise to transboundary harm and aggravation of impacts on others (e.g., when upstream States
respond to a basin-wide drought with increased water abstraction instead of demand
management).”
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does not only qualify as a climate change mitigation measure, but also as a
climate change adaptation measure.

II. OBSTACLES TO REGIONAL WATER-ENERGYCLIMATE COOPERATION
The Central Asian states have repeatedly confirmed their commitment
to regional cooperation in the water and energy sectors. The March 17, 1998
Agreement Between the Governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin
explicitly acknowledged the “benefits derived from the joint operation of
the reservoirs of the Naryn-Syr Darya Cascade, through a multi-year flow
regulation and flood control measures, including the use of water for irrigation and power generation,” and noted that “a joint and comprehensive use
of the water and energy resources of the Syr Darya basin must be implemented with regards to the environmental safety of the region.”114 Similarly, the June 17, 1999 Agreement between the Governments of
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan on the Parallel Operation of the Energy Systems of Central Asia explicitly recognized that
“strengthening friendly and good neighborly relations, establishing cooperation and mutual support between the Parties meet the traditional interests
of the Central Asian nations” and considered it “important to set favorable
conditions for the development of market relations between the economic
entities, and create an integrated electricity market in the future.”115
However, in practice, the cooperation principles underlying the regional energy and water agreements in Central Asia have largely remained
dead letters. In the post-Soviet context, cooperation has been affected by
important obstacles preventing the Central Asian countries from jointly exploiting the energy and water resources of the region to the mutual benefits
of all countries. Disputes about energy and water exchanges have demonstrated the difficulty that Central Asian states have in reaching agreement
on and, more importantly, implementing regional cooperation mechanisms.
It is necessary to carefully identify these obstacles in order to examine the
contribution that international law could make in solving these disputes and
in facilitating the achievement of the energy, water, and climate benefits of
regional cooperation in this field. The following discussion introduces some
114.
World Bank, supra note 36, app. 4 at 28 (reciting the preamble from the 1998
Agreement on the Use of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin).
115.
Agreement Between the Governments of the Republics of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Parallel Operation of the Energy Systems of Central Asia, June 17, 1999, http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/
mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/Parallel-Agreement.pdf
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of the main barriers that currently hinder the transboundary and integrated
management of water and energy resources following the collapse of the
Soviet Union.

A. Non-Implementation of Agreements
Regional cooperation in Central Asia suffers due to the lack of trust
between the Central Asian countries. In the water and energy sector, lack of
trust results from the states’ failure to respect their supply obligations under
regional energy and water agreements.116 The barter principle according to
which winter energy exports compensated for summer hydropower imports
created a time gap that proved to be very challenging to manage.117 Given
the quid pro quo nature of the barter scheme,118 non-implementation by one
of the parties of its supply obligations resulted in non-implementation by
the other.119 Following this vicious circle,120 lower water releases and reduced supply of hydropower by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the summer
resulted in decreased exports of thermal energy and fossil fuels by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.121 In turn, the limited availability of thermal energy in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan increased their reliance on hydropower in the
winter, therefore exacerbating the original barter imbalance.122
116.
See, e.g., Reshenie Ekonomicheskogo Soveta Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh
Gosudarstv “O Khode Vypolneniia Resheniia Ekonomicheskogo Soveta SNG ot 3 dekabria
2004 goda “O Polozhenii v Gidroenergetike Respubliki Tadzhikistan” [2008 Decision of the
Economic Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the State of Hydropower
in Tajikistan] Dec. 12, 2008, at 1; Thomas Bernauer & Tobias Siegfried, Compliance and
Performance in International Water Agreements: The Case of the Naryn/Syr Darya Basin, 14
GLOBAL GOV. 479 (2008). For an overview of the disputes relating to the implementation of
the water-energy agreements in Central Asia, see ARIEL DINAR ET AL., BRIDGES OVER WATER:
UNDERSTANDING TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION 344–45 (2013).
117.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 10–11; Shlomi Dinar, Treaty Principles and Patterns:
Selected International Water Agreements as Lessons for the Resolution of the Syr Darya and Amu
Darya Water Dispute, in TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES: STRATEGIES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
AND ECOLOGICAL STABILITY 147, 151 (Hartmut Vogtmann & Nikolay Dobretsov eds., 2005).
118.
See, e.g., Joint and Complex Use of Naryn Syr Darya Cascade Reservoirs Agreement, supra note 77, at art. 4 (establishing the right of the parties to adjust the schedule of
their mutual deliveries depending on water availability in the Syrdarya River Basin).
119.
See, e.g., Protocol of the Workshop, supra note 38.
120.
See Grunwald, supra note 37, at 2–13; ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at 14; see also
Leila Zakhirova, The International Politics of Water Security in Central Asia, 65 EUR-ASIA STUDIES 1994, 1995 (2013) (discussing “retaliatory threats” made by Kyrgyzstan to use its water
reserves for hydropower generation following disruptions of Uzbek gas supplies).
121.
See McKinney, supra note 38, at 211–12; see also DINAR ET AL., supra note 116, at 151.
122.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 10–11.
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Problems of reciprocity123 (or quid pro quo) in the exchange of energy
and water thus undermined regional cooperation in Central Asia, eventually
leading to the discontinuation of electricity exchanges and the withdrawal
of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan from the Central Asian Power System.124
The risk that parties would refuse to reciprocate on their resource supply
obligations is exacerbated by the absence of a clear enforcement regime in
the Central Asian energy and water agreements.125 In the absence of a clear
enforcement procedure, states cannot be certain that the other parties will
respect their obligations, which creates an incentive to exceed the agreedupon limits.126

B. The Value of Fossil Energy, Electricity, and Water
In line with world energy markets, the price of fossil fuels in Central
Asia increased considerably towards the end of the 1990s, causing the lower
riparian countries to request better prices for the energy exported in exchange for hydropower.127 Disputes over the cost of fossil fuel energy and
thermal power led to reductions and even interruption in the energy supply
to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, resulting in the increased use of hydropower
to compensate for these energy import deficits.128 In turn, this led to reduced water releases and reduced electricity exports to the lower riparian
states, which as introduced above exacerbated the vicious circle that characterized barter exchanges in Central Asia.129
The countries also disagreed upon whether upper riparian states should
be compensated for water storage services that support downstream sum123.
Reciprocity is generally considered to be a decisive vector of cooperation in the
field of shared resources. According to L EB , supra note 17, at 29, “if reciprocity does not take
place as a response to concessions, good faith is frustrated and cooperation is unlikely to
continue or to occur at all.”
124.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 4.
125.
See ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at 13; World Bank, supra note 36, at v, 19;
Dinara Ziganshina, International Water Law in Central Asia: Commitments, Compliance and
Beyond, 20 WATER L. 96, 101 (2009).
126.
Yuldosh Kh. Khudaiberganov, Particular Characteristics of Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM) in the Amudarya River Basin, in IMPLEMENTING WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA 35, 40–41 (Patricia Wouters et al. eds., 2007); see also Eric Sievers,
Water, Conflict, and Regional Security in Central Asia, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 356, 400 (2002).
127.
See, e.g., ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at 13; MCCAFFREY, supra note 42; World
Bank, supra note 36, at iii; Ziganshina, supra note 125, at 97; Christine Bichsel, Liquid Challenges: Contested Water in Central Asia, 12 SUST. DEV. L. & POL’Y , 24, 25–26 (2011); Dinara
Kemelova & Gennady Zhalkubaev, Central Asian Water: Conflict, and Regional Security Revisited, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 479 (2003).
128.
Khamidov, supra note 38, at 29; Bichsel, supra note 127, at 25–26.
129.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 10–11.
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mer irrigation.130 On the one hand, the upper riparian countries insisted
that the lower riparian countries should contribute to covering the costs of
maintaining water storage facilities (upstream regulation reservoirs).131 On
the other hand, the lower riparian countries invoked the “common-pool”
nature of basin water resources to oppose the commodification of water
services.132

C. National Energy Independence Versus Regional Cooperation
The drive towards national energy independence in Central Asia is a
crucial element in explaining states’ reluctance to continue to jointly organize their energy systems, despite the mutual benefits of cooperation for all
states concerned. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central
Asian countries aimed to reduce their dependency on neighboring states.
Energy independence (energy self-sufficiency or autonomy) is explicitly
recognized as a policy priority in the national energy strategies of all Central Asian countries.133 Paradoxically, these strategies recognize the benefits
of regional cooperation but focus mainly on the economic opportunities that
130.
See, e.g., Mukhammadiev, supra note 31, at 235; see also Arifov & Arifova, supra note
34.
131.
Kyrgyzstan’s 2001 Law on Inter-State Use of Water Resources, for instance, requires the payment by downstream countries for the services associated with water supply
through the Kyrgyz territory. Zakon Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki “O Mezhgosudarstvennom Ispol’zovanii Vodnykh Obektov, Vodnykh Resursov i Vodokhoziaistvennykh Sooruzheniiakh
Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki” art. 3 [The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic from July 23, 2001 No. 76
“About Interstate Use of Water Objects, Water Resources and Aquicultural Constructions of
the Kyrgyz Republic”] 55 ERKIN-TOO Aug. 1, 2001, No. 76. On this issue see, for example,
McKinney, supra note 38, at 204; Mukhammadiev, supra note 31, at 242. It must be noted
that international water law does not support the claim of “ownership” by a particular state
over the water resources of a transboundary watercourse flowing through its territory. MCCAFFREY, supra note 42, at 284.
132.
See Zakhirova, supra note 120, at 2003.
133.
See, e.g., Kontseptsiia Razvitiia Otraslei Toplivno-Energeticheskogo Kompleksa
Respubliki Tadjikistan Na Period 2003–2015 Godov [The 2003–2015 Concept of Development of the Fuel-Energy Complex of Tajikistan], http://tajhydro.tj/files/conception_of_development.pdf; Kontspetsiia Razvitiia Toplivno-Energeticheskogo Kompleksa
Respubliki Kazakhstan do 2030 Goda, Postanovnlenie Pravitel’stva Respubliki Kazakhstan
[The Concept for the Development of the Fuel-Energy Complex of Kazakhstan by 2030]
June 28, 2014, No. 724, http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-201407230031; Postanovlenie Prezidenta
Respubliki Uzbekistan o Prioritetakh Razvitiia Promyshlennosti Respubliki Uzbekistan v
2011-2015 Godakh [2010 Presidential Decree on the Priority Developments of the Industrial
Policy of Uzbekistan] Mar. 12, 2009, No. PP-1072; Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Respubliki
Uzbekistan 2010 [Collection of Legislation of the Republic of Uzebekistan], No. 50, Item
472, http://lex.uz/Pages/GetAct.aspx?lact_id=1712436; 2008–2012 Natsional’naia Energeticheskaia Programma Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki na 2008–2010 Gody i Strategiia Razvitiia
Toplivno-Energeticheskogo Kompleksa do 2025 Goda, Odobrena postanovleniem Zhogorku
Kenesha Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki [National Energy Program of Kyrgyzstan from 2008–2010
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this cooperation represents in terms of revenues from electricity exports.134
The strategic energy policy documents largely ignore the possibility of
achieving energy savings by importing electricity from neighboring states.

D. Geopolitics of Large Hydropower Generation
To maximize national energy independence and develop their energy
export potential, the upper riparian countries aim to build large hydropower
plants, including the infamous 3,200 megawatt Rogun project in Tajikistan
and the 2,000 megawatt Kambarata-1 project in Kyrgyzstan.135 These highly
controversial projects exacerbated the concerns of the lower riparian countries, in particular Uzbekistan, regarding access to water, resulting in acute
geopolitical tensions in the region.136 Uzbekistan emphasized the destructive impact that these investments will have on water, food, and environmental safety of the downstream countries.137 More importantly,
Uzbekistan has expressed concerns about the control that these large hydropower dams will give the higher riparian countries over regional water resources.138 The fear is that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would be in a position
to “dictate unilaterally the harsh terms of water discharge to downstream
countries, especially during vegetation of agricultural crops.”139 This would
lead to an “escalation of tensions and of conflict potential in the region of
Central Asia.”140 The perceived risk of “blackmail” by the lower riparian
countries is of great sensitivity for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, taking
and the Strategy for Fuel and Energy Complex Development Until 2025] Apr. 24, 2008, No.
346-IV, http://www.nomad.su/?a=3-201407230031.
134.
Boute, supra note 82.
135.
See Pöyry Energy Ltd., supra note 38. For both projects, initial construction works
were started. Work on the Kambarata-1 project was interrupted in December 2015 following
the decision by the Kyrgyz Government to cancel the intergovernmental agreement governing this investment.
136.
Iskandar Abdullayev et al., Water and Geopolitics in Central Asia, in WATER, ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY AND SUSTAINABLE RURAL DEVELOPMENT: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN CENTRAL
EURASIA 125–43 (Murat Arsel & Max Spoor eds., 2009).
137.
Letter from Rustam Azimov, First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Republic of Uzbekistan, to Jim Yong Kim, President, World Bank Group (July 7,
2014), http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/central-asia/
140808-gou-wbg-en.pdf.
138.
ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at 23.
139.
Rustam Azimov, First Deputy Prime-Minister and Minister of Finance of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Statement at the Proceedings of the High-Level Meeting on Regional
Riparian Issues in the Context of the “World Bank Note on Key Issues for Consideration on
the Proposed Rogun Hydropower Project” (July 18, 2014) (in Press Release, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.mfa.uz/en/press/
release/2014/08/2115/).
140.
Id. at 20.
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into account the fact that “water security is at the heart of their perceived
national security interests” due to the strategic importance of the agricultural (cotton) sector.141 Uzbekistan has therefore threatened military intervention should Tajikistan continue pursuing the Rogun project.142
The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment of the Rogun project, financed by the World Bank, confirms that Uzbekistan’s concerns are
justified.143 If Tajikistan decides to maximize the winter energy output of
the Rogun hydropower plant, the lower riparian countries would, according
to the World Bank’s assessment, experience “very serious consequences.”144
In particular, maximizing winter production from hydropower plants would
expose the lower riparian countries to reductions in the existing water release patterns for summer irrigation,145 thus threatening the strategically
important agricultural sector in these countries.146

E. Transit
Transboundary energy management depends on the extent to which
energy resources can freely flow from the supplying to the consuming country, including transit through third countries. Obstacles to free transit of
electricity and natural gas—mainly through Uzbekistan—currently hinder
regional energy exchanges in Central Asia.147
Given its central location within the regional system and its interconnection to all national Central Asian electricity networks, Uzbekistan is a
key transit country in the region and an essential link to the supply of
141.
ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at 3.
142.
Id. at 1; see also Stuart Horsman, Water in Central Asia, in CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY:
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 76 (Roy Allison & Lena Jonson eds., 2001).
143.
Pöyry Energy Ltd., supra note 38, at 15.
144.
Id. at 304; World Bank, supra note 36, at 16. On the possible negative impact of the
Rogun hydropower plant on Uzbekistan, see also Shokhrukh-Mirzo Jalilov et al., Impact of
Rogun Dam on Downstream Uzbekistan Agriculture, 3 INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES & ENVTL. ENGINEERING 161 (2011).
145.
See also MAKSUD BEKCHANOV ET AL., CENTER FOR INT’L DEV. & ENVTL. RES., IS ROGUN A
SILVER BULLET FOR WATER SCARCITY IN CENTRAL ASIA? (2013), http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/159075/2/Bekchanovetal2013aRogunimpactfinal.pdf (paper presented at the Young
Researchers’ Forum of the International Conference-Natural Resource Use in Central Asia:
Institutional Challenges and the Contribution of Capacity Building).
146.
Food & Agric. Org. of the U.N. [FAO], Irrigation in Central Asia in Figures, at
47–48, FAO Water Rep. No. 39 (2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i3289e/i3289e.pdf.
147.
See Evgeny Vinokurov, Obshchii elektroenergeticheskii rynok SNG kak instrument ekonomicheskogo razvitiia i regional’noi integratsii [Communal Electro-Powered Market CIS as an
Instrument of Economic Development and Regional Integration], in 1 EVRAZIISKAIA EKONOMICHESKAIA INTEGRATSIIA 54, 67–69 (2008), http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/docs/EDB_Mag_1
.pdf; see also Arifov & Arifova, supra note 34.
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thermal power to the upper riparian countries in the winter.148 Turkmenistan exported a substantial amount of electricity to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan by means of the Uzbek electricity network until Uzbekistan interrupted
these transit flows in January 2009.149 This interruption in the transmission
of Turkmen thermal power increased the electricity deficit in Tajikistan,
ultimately exacerbating the acute energy crisis affecting the country.150 Uzbekistan has so far refused to reauthorize the transit of Turkmen electricity
to the upper riparian countries, despite repeated requests from and negotiations between Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan.151

F. The Tragedy of the Commons and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
The failure of regional energy and water cooperation in Central Asia
could partly be explained on the basis of “rational choice” institutionalist
theories, in particular the theory of the supply of public goods (“tragedy of
the commons”) and game theory (“prisoner’s dilemma”).
Transboundary water management152 and regional electricity secur153
ity, to an important extent, meet the criteria of a public good or “common-pool” resource. According to the tragedy of the commons theory,
public goods tend to be over-exploited, leading to the depletion of these
resources.154 Uzbekistan invokes the fact that water is a common resource to
justify its refusal to pay for water supply, including the maintenance of
148.
Yasinskiy, supra note 55, at 171 (emphasizing Uzbekistan’s “important role in ensuring a reliable power supply to consumers in the region by facilitating the transit flow of
electricity exports to other countries”).
149.
Fields et al., supra note 84, at 69.
150.
Natalia Maqsimchook, Chronicle of Eurasian Regional Integration 2009, 2010 EDB
EURASIAN INTEGRATION Y.B. 77 (highlighting based on press releases that “[f]rom January 1,
2009 Uzbekistan halted transit of Turkmen electric power to Tajikistan and aggravated the
country’s crisis situation even further”).
151.
See Rejepova, supra note 95.
152.
See, e.g., Anders Jägerskog et al., Stockholm Int’l Water Inst., Transboundary Water
Management as a Regional Public Good: Financing Development – An Example from the Nile
Basin, SIWI Rep. No. 20, at 7 (2001), http://www.osce.org/eea/25306?download=true; Overseas Dev. Inst., Transboundary Water Management as an International Public Good, Study
2001:1, at 4 (2001), http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinionfiles/3870.pdf.
153.
See Malcolm Abbott, Is the Security of Electricity Supply a Public Good?, 14 ELECTRICITY
J. 31 (2001); see also EURELECTRIC, SECURITY OF ELECTRICITY SUPPLY – ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND
EXPERIENCES WITHIN THE EU 31 (2006); Enese Lieb-Dóczy et al., Who Secures the Security of
Supply? European Perspectives on Security, Competition, and Liability, 16 ELECTRICITY J. 10 (2003).
But see Henrik K. Jacobsen & Stine G. Jensen, Security of Supply in Electricity Markets: Improving Cost Efficiency of Supplying Security and Possible Welfare Gains, 43 INT’L J. ELECTRICAL POWER &
ENERGY SYS . 680 (2012); Cliff Rochlin, Resource Adequacy Requirement, Reserve Margin, and
the Public Goods Argument, 17 ELECTRICITY J. 52 (2004).
154.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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water storage infrastructure.155 Similiarly, the 2009 winter supply crisis in
Central Asia illustrates states’ temptation (in casu Tajikistan) to free-ride on
the investments of neighboring countries by exceeding their quota of electricity offtake in periods of scarce supply.156
Following the prisoner’s dilemma theory, states have a short-term interest in acting unilaterally, even if the overall benefits of cooperation exceed
the respective gains from individual action.157 In Central Asia, regional
agreements on water-energy cooperation were signed, but the lower and
upper riparian countries failed to honor their obligations.158 Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan did not supply the agreed volume of fossil fuel and thermal
energy, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan did not refrain from maximizing
winter hydro-energy production.159 This, arguably, could be explained by
the prisoner’s dilemma: countries try to avoid the cost of unilateral cooperation and, at the same time, try to benefit from the joint efforts made by
others in the rational management of shared resources.

G. Overcoming the Obstacles to Transboundary Water-EnergyClimate Management
The absence of cooperation in the organization of energy and water
supply in Central Asia results in the inefficient use of resources, presenting
a threat for energy and water security and possibly for peace in the region.160 Increasing winter hydropower generation in Kyrgyzstan—because of
its energy independence policy and disputes with Uzbekistan on energy
supply and transit—exposes the lower riparian countries to the risk of water
shortages in the summer and to floods in the winter.161 In addition to the
damage that flooding causes in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, winter energy
production causes irreversible water losses that affect the Aral Sea.162 More155.
See, e.g., Mukhammadiev, supra note 31, at 235.
156.
Fields et al., supra note 84.
157.
For an application of the “prisoner’s dilemma” theory to international environmental cooperation see, for example, SIMONE SCHIELE, EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIMES: THE CASE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 14 (2014).
158.
See supra Section II.A.
159.
Id.
160.
Daene C. McKinney & Ximing Cai, Multiobjective Water Resource Allocation
Model for Toktogul Reservoir 29 (June 9, 1997) (working paper), http://
www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/Model-Rpt.PDF.
161.
Bichsel, supra note 127, at 25–26; L EB , supra note 17, at 19; see also LARS C. MOLLER,
CENTRE FOR RESEARCH IN ECON. DEV. & INT’L TRADE (CREDIT), UNIV. OF NOTTINGHAM,
CREDIT RESEARCH PAPER NO. 05/09, TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICTS OVER HYDROPOWER AND
IRRIGATION: CAN MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS HELP? 23–28 (2005), http://
www.nottingham.ac.uk/credit/documents/papers/05-09.pdf.
162.
Khamidov, supra note 38, at 26; Mukhammadiev, supra note 31, at 237.
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over, by negatively impacting the efficiency of energy supply in the region,
energy independence in Central Asia increases the carbon intensity of the
region and therefore its overall contribution to global warming.163
The economic, social, and environmental benefits of regional cooperation far exceed the total gains that the Central Asian countries generate
from individual, national-centered actions. Game theory and principles of
public goods call for the creation of regional cooperation mechanisms to
overcome the incentives that Central Asian states have to free-ride on the
water and energy management efforts of their neighbors.164 The continous
involvement of Central Asian countries with each other provides a strong
practical reason for these states to work together to achieve the higher benefits of cooperation.
Given increasing mutual distrust between the countries, cooperation requires the establishment of a sufficiently strong institutional framework to
ensure that the parties comply with their reciprocal energy and water management obligations. Most analysts agree that, to ensure sustainable water
and energy supply, the lower riparian countries must ensure proper compensatory energy supplies—on a barter-like basis—to the upper riparian
countries.165 On one hand, the upper riparian countries must rely on a clear
and enforceable commitment by the lower riparian countries to supply fossil
energy at reasonable conditions (volume and price) in compensation for
winter storage of water for summer irrigation release.166 On the other, the
lower riparian countries must rely on clear guarantees that the upper riparian countries will not abuse their control over upstream water resources by
maximizing winter hydropower generation and so reduce water levels for
irrigation in the summer.

III. THE DUTY TO COOPERATE UNDER GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In light of the current regional political deadlock (or “unwillingness of
the states to cooperate”),167 it is essential to examine whether external legal
mechanisms are available to force—or at least guide—Central Asian countries in forming effective water-energy-climate cooperation mechanisms. In163.
Grunwald, supra note 37, at 2-6, 2-7; World Bank, supra note 36, at 29, 52.
164.
SCHIELE, supra note 157, at 18 (“[G]ame theory and the theory of the provision of
public goods, illustrate that the only possible solution for international environmental issues
is the collective management of common goods, aiming at coordinated action of all actors
and shaping their expectations on the actions of other actors.”).
165.
See Protocol of the Workshop, supra note 38; Khamidov, supra note 38, at 29; Pöyry
Energy Ltd., supra note 38, at 321; McKinney, supra note 38, at 205.
166.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 21.
167.
ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at ii.
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ternational law has an important role to play in the design, implementation,
and enforcement of mechanisms addressing the short-term free-rider barrier
to transboundary resource management. Before looking at cooperation requirements under international water, climate, and energy law, it is necessary to examine states’ rights and obligations under the principle of national
sovereignty over natural resources and the general good-faith duty to
cooperate.

A. Limits to National Sovereignty over Natural Resources
In accordance with the international law principle of national sovereignty over natural resources,168 states are free to develop and export their
domestic energy resources.169 The decision to export energy is the sovereign prerogative of the state controlling the energy resources.170 On this
basis, the energy-rich states in Central Asia (i.e., Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
and Turkmenistan) have no obligation to develop their resources and supply
the energy-poor states (i.e., Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan).
Similarly, regarding the ambitious hydropower projects of the upper
riparian countries (i.e., Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), international law recognizes states’ sovereign rights to develop the infrastructure that is necessary
for the exploitation of water resources in their territories.171 The states affected by infrastructure projects have the right to be consulted and their
interests must be taken into account. However, unless provided otherwise
by treaties, this does not entail a right to veto these plans.172 The lower
riparian countries (i.e., Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan) thus do
not have the right under international water law to block the realization of
the controversial Rogun and Kambarata hydropower plants in Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan.
The Lac Lanoux arbitration case provides interesting insight into on a
similar situation: the realization by France of construction works on Lake
168.
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (Dec. 14, 1962); G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
(Dec. 12, 1974).
169.
See NICO SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES 264–65 (2008).
170.
But see Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare
Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum, WTO Doc. WT/DS431/AB/R (adopted Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds431_e.htm (where various restrictions on the export of natural resources imposed by China were found to be inconsistent
with China’s WTO obligations).
171.
See L EB , supra note 17, at 142.
172.
Id.; see also Alistair Rieu-Clarke, Notification and Consultation on Planned Measures
Concerning International Watercourses: Learning Lessons from the Pulp Mills and Kishenganga
Cases, 24 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 102 (2014).
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Lanoux, a lake shared with Spain.173 The starting point of the arbitration
decision in the Lac Lanoux case was that states have the sovereign right to
implement works that affect the flow of water to third countries.174 The
arbitration panel did “not find . . . in international common law [ ] any rule
that forbids one State, acting to safeguard its legitimate interests, to put
itself in a situation which would in fact permit it, in violation of its international pledges, seriously to injure a neighboring State.”175 The tribunal rejected Spain’s claim that the realization by France of the planned works
required “the previous agreement of both Governments, in the absence of
which the country making the proposal is not at liberty to undertake the
works.”176 According to the Lac Lanoux arbitration decision, requiring a previous agreement of both states would introduce a “right of assent” or “right
of veto” which in fact could paralyze the exercise by the state of its territorial jurisdiction.177
Nevertheless, the exercise of national sovereignty of states over their
natural resources is not unlimited. Every state has a duty not to “allow
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other
states.”178 Although states do not have an obligation to grant advantages to
another states, states must not cause injury,179 or must at least take preventive measures to avoid harm or minimize unavoidable damage.180 In the Lac
Lanoux case, the arbitral tribunal noted that although “France [in casu the
upper riparian state] is entitled to exercise her rights[,] she cannot ignore
the Spanish interests. Spain [the lower riparian state] is entitled to demand
that her rights be respected and that her interests be taken into consideration.”181 Applied to the construction of large hydropower plants in Central
Asia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are bound by the duty to avoid significant
harm to their downstream neighbors and thus cannot ignore the interests of
173.
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1957).
174.
Id. at 126.
175.
Id. Similarly, the ICJ determined that “the State initiating the plan may, at the end
of the negotiation period, proceed with construction at its own risk. . . . Uruguay did not
bear any ‘no construction obligation’ after the negotiation period . . . .” Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 18, ¶¶ 154, 157 (Apr. 20).
176.
Lake Lanoux, 24 I.L.R. at 127.
177.
Id. at 128.
178.
Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).
179.
Max Huber, Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Gebietshoheit an Grenzflüssen [A CONTRIBUTION TO THE TEACHING OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OVER BOUNDARY RIVERS] 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
VÖLKERRECHT UND BUNDESSTAATSRECHT [ J. INT’L & FED. L.] 29, 163, 214 (1907).
180.
PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 246 (2d ed. 2003).
181.
Lake Lanoux, 24 I.L.R. at 124; see also Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v.
Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 18, ¶¶ 154, 157 (Apr. 20); SANDS, supra note 180, at
242–43.
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the lower riparian countries when implementing these projects. In particular, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan must avoid maximizing winter hydropower
generation given the potential harm182 that this operational mode can have
on the availability of water for irrigation in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan.183
To trigger the responsibility of states under international law, countries
that are exposed to serious harm cannot have willfully contributed to the
injury.184 In Central Asia, the only reasonable alternative to winter hydropower generation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is the supply of compensatory thermal power or fossil fuels by Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan.185 By suddenly reducing or interrupting the supply of thermal power and fossil fuel exports to the upper riparian countries, the energy-rich lower riparian countries in Central Asia contribute to the injury
that they are enduring—thus undermining their protection under the law of
international responsibility.

B. The Principle of “Good Neighborly Relations”
The international law duty to avoid harm is part of the principle of
“good neighborly relations between states.186 The regional agreements governing energy and water supply in Central Asia recognize the importance of
“strengthening friendly and good neighborly relations” and “establishing cooperation and mutual support” between the Central Asian countries.187
182.
See Pöyry Energy Ltd., supra note 38, at 304, 309 (referring to “potentially serious
effects” and “very serious consequences”).
183.
Id.
184.
On the question of the contribution of the victim state to the injury, see Anaı̈s
Moutier-Lopet, Contribution to the Injury, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 641
(James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
185.
See Protocol of the Workshop, supra note 38; Khamidov, supra note 38, at 29–30;
McKinney, supra note 38, at 205; Pöyry Energy Ltd., supra note 38, at 321.
186.
According to Judge Weeramantry, the ICJ “from the very commencement of its
jurisprudence, has supported [the principle of good neighborliness] by spelling out the duty
of every State not to ‘allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights
of other States.’” Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. Rep. 3, 506 (July 8) (Weeramantry, J., dissenting) (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v.
Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22 (Apr. 9)).
187.
See Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan, and the Republic of Uzbekistan on the Parallel
Operation of the Energy Systems of Central Asia, pmbl, June 17, 1999 (“Recognizing that
strengthening friendly and good neighborly relations, establishing cooperation and mutual
support between the Parties meet the traditional interests of the Central Asian nations . . .”),
http://www.ce.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/papers/aral/agreements/Parallel-Agreement.pdf;
see also Agreement Between the Governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz
Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the
Chu and Talas Rivers, pmbl., Jan. 21, 2000, http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/
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However, the agreements do not define what is meant by these principles
and objectives. An analysis of the concept of “good neighborliness” under
international law can help contextualize the obligations that the Central
Asian countries have in relation to each other regarding energy and water
management.
States’ responsibilities not to cause damage above a certain threshold is
particularly prominent in the field of environmental protection, including
water resources management.188 The principle of “good neighborliness” also
applies to interstate economic and social harm189—and is therefore relevant
to cross-border energy transactions. For example, states could invoke a duty
to avoid harm caused by the sudden reduction or interruption of energy
flows to neighboring countries that depend on these imports for their energy security. As demonstrated by the 2009 Tajik winter energy crisis, the
interruption of energy flows and the refusal to cooperate can have drastic
economic and social consequences for energy-importing countries190—possibly leading to loss of life or inhuman treatment of individuals in these countries.191 The duty to avoid harm to third countries requires exporting and
water/Chu-Talas/ChuTalas_Agreement_ENG.pdf [hereinafter Chu and Talas Rivers Agreement] (“respecting the principles of neighborliness, equality, and mutual assistance”); World
Bank, supra note 36, app. 4 at 28 (reciting the preamble from the 1998 Agreement on the Use
of Water and Energy Resources of the Syr Darya Basin: “Guided by sincere spirits of goodneighborliness and cooperation”).
188.
See SANDS, supra note 180, at 241–42. According to the famous Trail Smelter arbitral decision, “Under the principles of international law . . . no state has the right to use or
permit the use of territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory
of another of the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.” Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3
R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (Mar. 11, 1941).
189.
Article 74 of the U.N. Charter recognizes non-environmental interests within the
concept of good neighborliness:
Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan
areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighborliness, due account
being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social,
economic, and commercial matters.
U.N. Charter art. 74. Along the same line, the Resolution of the UN General Assembly of 14
December 1979 on Development and Strengthening of Good Neighborliness between States
recognizes “new dimensions” to good neighborliness, given “great changes of a political, economic and social nature.” G.A. Res. 34/99, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/99, ¶ 4 (Dec. 14, 1979),
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/34/a34res99.pdf.
190.
Fields et al., supra note 84.
191.
See DANAE AZARIA, TREATIES ON TRANSIT OF ENERGY VIA PIPELINES AND COUNTERMEASURES 232 (2015) (“[I]f individuals are deprived of sufficient heating, water, lighting, sanitation, and medical assistance or the use of medical equipment in hospitals or at home due to
interruptions of electricity, oil, and gas, there may be loss of life, or individuals may be
subject to inhuman treatment or their health may be put at risk.”).
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transit countries to take these economic and, more importantly, social consequences into account when deciding whether to reduce energy flows or
interrupt energy supply to other nations. Indeed, according to Resolution
2849 of the UN General Assembly, states must “[r]espect fully the exercise
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as well as the right of each
country to exploit its own resources in accordance with its own priorities
and needs and in such a manner as to avoid producing harmful effects on other
countries.”192
The obligation to avoid harm due to energy supply interruptions is
stronger for states located in close geographic proximity to one another.
According to the Resolution of the UN General Assembly of 14 December
1979 on Development and Strengthening of Good Neighborliness between
States, the “geographic proximity” of neighboring states creates “particularly
favorable” opportunities for cooperation.193 In contrast to exports taking
place on the international energy markets, energy exchanges through network infrastructure generate a specific relationship of dependency.194 Exporting and importing countries are therefore most directly affected by the
interruption of energy supply or reduction of transit flows through this infrastructure. The particularly high interdependency and proximity of Central Asian countries in the energy and water sectors hence calls for a higher
degree of care.

C. Duty to Cooperate in Good Faith
Similar to states’ obligation to avoid harm, the duty to cooperate—and
negotiate—in good faith to settle inter-state disputes is a principle of international law.195 It is of particular relevance to energy, water, and environmental protection,196 as highlighted by the following declarations.
192.
G.A. Res. 2849 (XXVI), U.N. Doc. A.RES/2849, art. 4(a) (Dec. 20, 1971) (emphasis added).
193.
G.A. Res. 34/99, supra note 189, ¶ 4.
194.
See AZARIA, supra note 191, at 114 (arguing that “the main feature of transit (and
transportation) of energy via pipelines is physical interdependence”).
195.
See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3; see, e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Place and Role of
Unilateralism in Contemporary International Law, 11 EUROPEAN J. INT’L L. 19, 22 (2000). Although Delbrück argues that a general obligation to cooperate does not exist under international law, he recognizes that there is a duty for states to cooperate in good faith in order to
settle inter-state disputes. Delbrück, supra note 41, at 12, 15.
196.
See SANDS, supra note 180, at 250 (“[T]he obligation to co-operate is affirmed in
virtually all international environmental agreements of bilateral and regional application and
global instruments.”); see also PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
175–76 (3d ed. 2009); Peter Sand, Principle 27: Cooperation in a Spirit of Global Partnership, in
THE RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT – A COMMENTARY 617–18 (Jorge
Vinuales ed., 2015).
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According to Principle 7 of the 1978 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Draft Principles of Conduct for the Guidance of States in
the Conservation and Harmonious Exploitation of Natural Resources
Shared by Two or More States, “Exchange of information, notification, consultation and other forms of cooperation regarding shared natural resources
are carried out on the basis of the principle of good faith and in the spirit of
good neighbourliness.”197 In the same vein, Principle 24 of the Stockholm
Declaration on Human Environment provides that “[i]nternational matters
concerning the protection and improvement of the environment should be
handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big or small, on an equal
footing.”198 According to Principle 27 of the Rio Declaration, “States and
people shall cooperate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership in the
fulfillment of the principles embodied in this Declaration and in the further
development of international law in the field of sustainable
development.”199
In addition to notification and sharing of information,200 the duty to
cooperate under international law requires consultation, negotiation, and
participation rights in certain decisionmaking.201 Although states are bound
by an obligation to negotiate agreements in good faith, states are not required to subordinate the exercise of their sovereign rights in favor of con-

197.
Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of
States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two
or More States princ. 7, May 19, 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1097 (1978); see also SANDS, supra
note 180, at 250.
198.
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, princs. 6, 7, 15, 18, 24, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/
Rev.1 (June 16, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416.
199.
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug.
12, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
200.
Different international treaties establish an obligation for states to provide information on activities conducted on their territory that can seriously affect neighboring states.
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 198, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal art. 13, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 126.
201.
See Philippe Sands, Environmental Protection in the Twenty-First Century: Sustainable
Development and International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 369, 374 (Richard Revesz et al. eds., 2004). According to the ICJ in Pulp Mills
on the River Uruguay, “the obligation to notify is intended to create the conditions for successful co-operation between the parties . . . . [T]he obligation to notify is therefore an essential
part of the process leading the parties to consult in order to assess the risks of the plan and to
negotiate possible changes which may eliminate those risks or minimize their effects.” (Arg.
v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 18, ¶¶ 113, 115 (Apr. 20).
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cluding such an agreement.202 According to the tribunal in the Lac Lanoux
case,
the reality of the obligations thus undertaken is incontestable and
sanctions can be applied in the event, for example, of an unjustified
breaking off of the discussions, abnormal delay, disregard of the
agreed procedures, systematic refusals to take into consideration
adverse proposals or interests, and, more generally, in cases of violation of the rules of good faith.203
Good faith, as a principle of international law,204 is important for water
and energy cooperation in Central Asia because it relates directly to the
central weaknesses of state relations in this sector: limited trust regarding
the reciprocal implementation of regional agreements and the absence of
any real attempt to make concessions to accommodate the interests of the
other parties. As mentioned in Part II, supra, cooperation between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the electricity and water sector is at a
historically low point—with Uzbekistan reiterating its opposition to the development of large hydropower projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and
the latter nations insisting on their right to develop their potential in hydro
resources.
Although “not in itself a source of obligation where none would otherwise exist,”205 the principle of good faith is crucial in the Central Asian
context because it requires from states a certain balance in the exercise of
their rights. In case of conflict on the exercise of their respective rights,
states must, according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction case, “conduct their negotiations on the basis that
each must in good faith pay reasonable regard to the legal rights of the
other.”206 Moreover, although states are not under a strict obligation to
reach agreement, they must consider modifications to their positions in

202.
Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101, 128 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1957).
203.
Id. (citing Tacna-Arica Question (Chile v. Peru), 2 R.I.A.A. 921 (1925); Railway
Traffic Between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, 1931 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 42, at
108 (Oct. 15)).
204.
See, e.g., Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 275, ¶ 38 (June 11).
205.
Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 1988 I.C.J.
Rep. 69, ¶ 94 (Dec. 20).
206.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 175, ¶ 69 (July
25). On the requirement of “equitable balancing” of transboundary environmental risk, see
also BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 196, at 180–81.
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view of achieving a compromise.207 According to the ICJ in the North Sea
Continental Shelf case, the parties to a dispute are
under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement and not merely to go through a formal process
of negotiation. . . . [T]hey are under an obligation so to conduct
themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be
the case when either of them insists upon its own position without
contemplating any modification of it.208
In the Gabčı́kovo-Nagymaros case concerning the negative transboundary impact of a hydropower plant project, the ICJ ruled that states
(Hungary and Slovakia) “must negotiate in good faith in the light of the
prevailing situation, and must take all necessary measures to ensure the
achievement of the objectives of the Treaty (governing the project) in accordance with such modalities as they may agree upon.”209 Following this approach, states have an obligation under international law to carry out
cooperative acts “in good faith and with a view to achieving mutual
benefits.”210
The high political sensitivity of hydropower projects in Central Asia
and threat of armed conflict surrounding Tajikstan’s proposed Rogun project211 may also trigger the application of Article 33 of the UN Charter.212
This provision establishes the obligation for states to seek a solution to
international disputes by negotiation and other peaceful means, including
disputes about the utilization of transboundary water resources that compromise international peace and security.213 In Central Asia, peaceful coexistence and positive cooperation in the water and energy sectors are
interrelated. With looming climate change and increasing scarcity of water
207.
See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 47, ¶¶ 85–87 (Feb. 20).
208.
Id. ¶ 85.
209.
Gabčı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 41, ¶ 155 (Sept.
25).
210.
L EB , supra note 17, at 109.
211.
ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at 3.
212.
U.N. Charter art. 33.
213.
L EB , supra note 17, at 147; see, also MCCAFFREY, supra note 42, at 433 (providing an
overview of disputes over shared water resources that threatened, and in some cases even
breached, international peace and security); Gabriel Eckstein, Water Scarcity, Conflict, and
Security in a Climate Change World: Challenges and Opportunities for International Law and Policy, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409 (2010). More generally, it must be noted that according to Principle 25 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, “Peace, development and
environmental protection are interdependent and indivisible.” Rio Declaration, supra note
199, at princ. 25.
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resources, not working together in the management of water and energy
resources will increase the probability of conflicts regarding the availability
of these resources.214

IV. COOPERATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL WATER, CLIMATE,
AND ENERGY L AW
International law imposes on the Central Asian states a duty to cooperate in good faith so as to minimize the harm and risk of conflict that unilateral decisions regarding energy and water supply could generate in the
region. However, the duties to avoid harm and to cooperate in good faith
are broad requirements that must be further defined in their application to
the challenges characterizing the transboundary management of water and
energy resources. International water, climate, and energy law recognize the
importance of interstate cooperation and establish more specific mechanisms to facilitate joint actions in their respective fields.
This Part critically examines how the cooperation mechanisms under
international water, climate, and energy law could help the Central Asian
countries in addressing the obstacles to water and energy cooperation in the
region.215 The following analysis focuses on the legal nature of these sectorspecific cooperation requirements and questions the extent to which these
legal disciplines relate to each other in a mutually reinforcing way. As introduced above,216 synergies are needed to achieve water, energy, and climate
security in the most effective way.
This study of international water, climate, and energy law is not limited
to the definition of a duty of cooperation stricto sensu. It covers a broad
range of cooperation mechanisms, including river basin management
schemes, energy trade, transit and investment, and carbon finance. As will
be argued, these mechanisms can play a role in facilitating the integrated
management of transboundary resources in Central Asia by addressing the
existing obstacles of lack of trust, transit restrictions, and non-enforcement
of agreements.217
214.
According to Mukhammadiev, supra note 31, at 246, “A failure to take all relevant
factors affecting the evolution of water relations in the basin into account will certainly
contribute to regional insecurity and increase the risk of raising potential conflicts over water
among the Central Asian states.” More generally, on the increased risks of water disputes in
a context of climate change, see CONVENTION ON THE PROTECTION AND USE OF TRANSBOUNDARY
WATERCOURSES AND INTERNATIONAL LAKES, GUIDANCE ON WATER AND ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE
CHANGE, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/30, U.N. Sales No. 09.II.E.14 (2009), www.unece.org/
index.php?id=11658.
215.
See supra Part II.
216.
See supra Introduction.
217.
See supra Part II.
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A. Transboundary Resources Management Under International
Water Law
1. The Principle: Cooperation for Optimal Water
Utilization
International water law provides guidance on how the general duty to
cooperate can—and in certain cases must—be operationalized in relation to
integrated water and energy management in Central Asia. The principle of
cooperation is reflected in the UN Watercourses Convention218 and the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) Water Convention,219 the two foundational treaties in the field of transboundary water
management.
“Affirming the importance of international cooperation and goodneighborliness in this field,”220 the UN Watercourses Convention imposes
an “obligation not to cause significant harm”221 in utilizing an international
watercourse and a “general obligation to cooperate”222 in the management of
transboundary water resources.223 Recognizing that “cooperation among riparian States on transboundary watercourses and international lakes contributes to peace and security and to sustainable water management, and is
to everyone’s benefit,”224 the UNECE Water Convention requires riparian
218.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13.
219.
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 1936 U.N.T.S. 269 (entered into force Oct. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Water
Convention].
220.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at pmbl.
221.
Id. at art. 7.
222.
Id. at art. 8.
223.
L EB , supra note 17, at 80. It must be noted that, in practice, water cooperation
cannot be regarded separately from the duty to avoid harm given the interdependency between the riparian states. Interpreting the Statute of the River Uruguay, Arg.-Uru., Feb. 26,
1975, 1295 U.N.T.S. 340 (1982), the ICJ considered in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay that “it
is by co-operating that the States concerned can jointly manage the risks of damage to the
environment that might be created by the plans initiated by one or other of them, so as to
prevent the damage in question.” Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment,
2010 I.C.J. Rep. 18, ¶ 77 (Apr. 20). In the same vein, Herbert Smith argued,
The first principle is that every river system is naturally an indivisible physical
unit, and that as such it should be so developed as to render the greatest possible
service to the whole human community which it serves, whether or not that community is divided into two or more political jurisdictions. It is the positive duty of
every government concerned to cooperate to the extent of its power in promoting
this development . . . .
MCCAFFREY, supra note 42, at 466 (quoting HERBERT SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 150–51 (1931)).
224.
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in
a Transboundary Context, Report of the Meeting of the Parties on its Sixth Session, Decision VI/3
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states to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements “in order to define
their mutual relations and conduct regarding the prevention, control and
reduction of transboundary impact.”225 The Contracting Parties to the
UNECE Water Convention “shall take all appropriate measures to prevent,
control and reduce any transboundary impact”—and in particular ensure
ecologically sound, reasonable, and equitable water use by taking into account the transboundary nature of the shared water resources.226
All lower riparian countries in the Amu Darya and Syr Darya river
basins—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan—have ratified the
UNECE Water Convention.227 Among the Central Asian states, only Uzbekistan ratified the UN Watercourses Convention.228 Despite limited participation in Central Asia, the UN Watercourses Convention is of great
relevance for the transboundary management of water and energy resources
in the region229 because its most fundamental obligations reflect customary
norms.230 An additional value of the UN Watercourses Convention is that it
on Accession by non-U.N. Economic Council for Europe Countries, at 4, U.N. Doc. ECE/
MP.WAT/37/Add.2, IV/1 (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/
water/mop_6_Rome/Official_documents/ECE_MP.WAT_37_Add.2_ENG.PDF.
225.
Water Convention, supra note 219, at art. 9, ¶ 1.
226.
Id. at art. 4, ¶¶ 1–2.
227.
Ratification Status of the Water Convention, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://
www.unece.org/env/water/status/legal1.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2015) (follow link for “Parties and Signatories to the Water Convention”). On the contribution of the UNECE Water
Convention to water cooperation in Central Asia, see Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Strengthening
Water Management and Transboundary Water Cooperation in Central Asia: The Role of UNECE
Environmental Conventions, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.WAT/35 (2011), http://www.unece.org/
fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/documents/Water_Management_En.pdf.
228.
Uzbekistan acceded to the U.N. Watercourses Convention on September 4, 2007.
Ratification Status of the Water Convention, supra note 227. See generally Alistair Rieu-Clarke &
Alexander López, Why Have States Joined the UN Watercourses Convention?, in THE U.N. WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL L AW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY WATER
MANAGEMENT 36–45 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 2013) (providing an
analysis of the rationale behind states’ ratification—and lack of ratification—of the U.N. Watercourses Convention).
229.
On the relevance of the U.N. Watercourses Convention for water management in
Central Asia, see Ziganshina, supra note 125, at 177–222 and Dinara Ziganshina, UNESCO
Ctr. for Water Law, Policy & Sci. & World Wildlife Fund, The Role and Relevance of the U.N.
Watercourses Convention to the Countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan in the Aral Sea Basin
(2011).
230.
According to MCCAFFREY, supra note 42, at 376, “it seems clear that the most important elements of the Convention—equitable utilization, prevention of harm, prior notification, protection of ecosystems—are, in large measure, codifications of norms that either exist
or, in the case of ecosystem protection, are at least emerging.” See also Gabčı́kovoNagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 41, ¶¶ 85, 155 (Sept. 25); Flavia
Rocha Loures et al., The Authority and Function of the UN Watercourses Convention, in THE UN
WATERCOURSES CONVENTION IN FORCE: STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR TRANSBOUNDARY
WATER MANAGEMENT 49, 52–53 (Flavia Rocha Loures & Alistair Rieu-Clarke eds., 2013);
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can act as a “legal roadmap” for negotiations of regional water and waterenergy management agreements.231
According to the UN Watercourses Convention, cooperation between
watercourse states can only be meaningful if it takes place on the basis of
“sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in
order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.”232 The mutual benefits of cooperation on the utilization
of shared water resources relate to the “community of interests” that characterizes international watercourses and water basins.233 Because of this community of interests, cooperation should be directed at achieving the
“maximum possible benefits for all watercourse States and achieving the
greatest possible satisfaction of all their needs, while minimizing the detriment, or unmet needs of each.”234 This implies a duty to utilize transboundary waters in an “equitable and reasonable” way,235 by considering the
legitimate interests of other watercourse states236 and taking all appropriate
measures to avoid significant harm to other watercourse states.237 Equitable
and reasonable utilization of transboundary water resources, among others,
depends on “the availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.”238
Stephen McCaffrey, The Contribution of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1 INT’L J. GLOBAL ENVTL. ISSUES 250, 259 (2001).
231.
LAURENCE BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, FRESH WATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27–28, 65
(2013).
232.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 8, ¶ 1.
233.
See Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder
(U.K., Czech Solvk., Den., Fr., Ger., & Swed./Pol.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 27
(explaining the notion of “community of interests” of riparian states); Gabčı́kovoNagymaros Project , 1997 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 85.
234.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 49
U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 89, 97, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1994] 2 Y.B.
INT’L L. CO M M ’N 89, 97, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2) [hereinafter Report
of the International Law Commission].
235.
See U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at arts. 5–6; see also Water Convention, supra note 219, at art. 2, ¶ 2; MCCAFFREY, supra note 42, at 384–85; IBRAHIM KAYA,
EQUITABLE UTILIZATION: THE LAW OF NON-NAVIGATIONAL USES OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 81
(2003); EDITH BROWN WEISS, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR A WATER-SCARCE WORLD 25 (2013) (explaining the customary international law nature of this principle).
236.
See Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 24 I.L.R. 101, 116 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1957).
237.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 7; see MCCAFFREY, supra note
42, at 431–36 (discussing the threshold at which harm “becomes wrongful under general
international law”).
238.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 6, ¶ 1.
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2. Putting the Principle to the Test: Integrated WaterEnergy Cooperation in Central Asia
International principles of transboundary water management239 apply
principally to the upper riparian countries but are not limited to such states.
Depending on the particular geographic conditions characterizing river basins, the lower riparian countries can also play a role in the mitigation of
harm and the achievement of community interests in the river basin.240
Applied to Central Asia, the cooperation principle under international
water law relates to the interests of both lower and upper riparian countries.
On the one hand, international water law protects the legitimate interests of
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan regarding access to water—a
particularly important issue in the context of the planned construction of
the Rogun and Kambarata hydropower plants. On the other hand, international water law provides a strong legal basis to stimulate direct Kazakh,
Uzbek, and Turkmen participation in securing the supply of energy during
the winter to compensate Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for reduced hydropower generation.
Although Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan do not have the
right to veto the planned hydropower plants, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
must take their downstream water interests into account when developing
these hydropower projects. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan must take
all necessary measures to prevent, eliminate, and mitigate “significant harm”
to the lower riparian states. The planned large hydropower projects in
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are most likely to meet the threshold of “significant harm” under international water law. As explained above, the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment of the controversial 3,200 megawatt
Rogun project in Tajikistan highlighted the “very serious consequences” that
this hydropower plant could have on the lower riparian countries in case of
maximization of winter energy generation.241
Tajikistan, with the support of the World Bank, conducted consultations with all riparian countries to assess the impact of the project on the
lower riparian countries.242 The World Bank positively assessed the economic feasibility and environmental impact of the project, provided there
239.
See MCCAFFREY, supra note 42, at 437–45 (describing the “required standard of conduct” in the field of transboundary water management).
240.
The U.N. Watercourses Convention itself does not make any distinction between
upstream and downstream countries—but geography makes certain rules more pertinent for
upstream and downstream states in practice. See id. at 412–13.
241.
See Pöyry Energy Ltd., supra note 38, at 304, 309.
242.
World Bank, The Final Reports Related to the Proposed Rogun HPP, TAJIKISTAN (Nov. 3,
2015, 5:24 PM), http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/brief/final-reports-relatedto-the-proposed-rogun-hpp; see also World Bank, supra note 36.
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were adequate guarantees to avoid maximization of winter hydropower production.243 However, Uzbekistan continues to oppose the implementation
of the Rogun project based on the control that it could give to Tajikistan on
water flows to the lower riparian countries.244
Blocking Uzbekistan’s, Kazakhstan’s, or Turkmenistan’s access to
water—or threatening to block this access—for purely political, geopolitical,
or commercial purposes would constitute a breach of international water
law. Harm to downstream interests from the operation of Rogun and
Kambarata would violate the UN Watercourses Convention and the
UNECE Water Convention unless Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan ensure “equitable and reasonable utilization” of upstream water resources and take “all
appropriate measures” to prevent, eliminate, or mitigate this harm.245 Using
or abusing control over upstream reservoirs to influence the price of hydropower sales or the conditions of fossil fuel purchases does not qualify as a
reasonable utilization of an international watercourse. This behavior would
contradict the “required standard of conduct”246 (“due diligence”)247 in the
field of transboundary water management, and thus amount to a breach of
these international agreements.
Based on the criteria of the UN Watercourses Convention, maximizing
winter energy production could be an equitable and reasonable utilization of
transboundary water resources in the absence of “alternatives, of comparable
value.”248 Thermal energy is an alternative to hydropower but requires the
availability of fossil fuels. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have limited access to
domestic sources of fossil fuels. The supply of fossil fuels and thermal energy from non-Central Asian countries is complicated by the competition
for resources in the region (e.g., from China, India, and Pakistan) and internationally, resulting in higher costs. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmen243.
See World Bank, supra note 36, at 16 (concluding that the Rogun project “could be
built and operated at the Rogun site within international safety norms [and] recommend[ing]
mitigation and monitoring measures to manage the environmental and social impacts, particularly regarding resettlement and potential changes in downstream hydrology”).
244.
It must be noted that Uzbekistan contests the independence and objectivity of the
World Bank’s assessment based on the fact that the study was commissioned by Tajikistan.
Id. at 7.
245.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 31, provides an exception to
the obligation to share information for national defense and security matters. However, this
exception is unlikely to apply to the control over water resources as “weapon.”
246.
See MCCAFFREY, supra note 42, at 437–45.
247.
See Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 18,
¶ 197 (Apr. 20) (on the obligation to “act with due diligence” (with “a certain level of vigilance”) in respect to the utilization of transboundary water resources); see also Leslie-Anne
Duvic-Paoli & Jorge Vinuales, Principle 2 – Prevention, in THE RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT – A COMMENTARY 128, 134 (Jorge Vinuales ed., 2015).
248.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 6, ¶ g.
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istan are endowed with considerable fossil fuel reserves in direct geographic
proximity to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Taking into account the historic
interdependence between the lower and upper riparian countries and existing interconnections, the reasonableness of winter hydropower production largely depends on energy supply from the lower riparian countries.249
According to Stanislav Zhukov, head of the Center for Energy Studies in
the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian
Academy of Sciences, “Central Asian gas trade can be described as ‘forced’,
inasmuch as a range of economic and infrastructure interdependencies make
the central Asian republics ‘brothers in gas.’”250 The capacity of Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan to prevent harm on the lower riparian countries251 is thus
related to the extent to which the latter nations are ready to provide access,
on reasonable terms, to their fossil energy.
On this basis, the lower riparian countries have a responsibility to facilitate the reasonable and equitable utilization of water resources in Tajikistan
and Kyrgyzstan. By guaranteeing adequate supplies of thermal energy at
affordable prices, the lower riparian countries contribute to the availability
of alternative modes of energy production to winter hydropower generation,
de facto securing their downstream water interests. A contrario, by failing to
secure winter energy supplies to the upper riparian countries, the lower
riparian countries contribute to justifying the reasonable and equitable nature of winter hydropower generation. The extent to which the upper and
lower riparian countries are able to successfully cooperate on the supply of
winter energy supplies thus influences the application of the principles of
“no harm” and “equitable and reasonable utilization” in Central Asia.252
249.
See, e.g., Khamidov, supra note 38, at 29; McKinney, supra note 38, at 205; Pöyry
Energy Ltd., supra note 38, at 321.
250.
Stanislav Zhukov, Uzbekistan: A Domestically Oriented Gas Producer, in RUSSIAN AND
CIS GAS MARKETS AND THEIR MARKET ON EUROPE 370 (Simon Pirani ed., 2009).
251.
According to MCCAFFREY, supra note 42, at 444–45,
[F]or the “no-harm” obligation to be breached . . . significant harm must result in
one state from activities in another state; the latter must not only have failed to
prevent the harm by its conduct but must also have been capable of preventing it
by different conduct; and the conduct or use resulting in the harm must be unreasonable (inequitable) under the circumstances.
Id.
252.
According to McCaffrey, the principle of “no harm” “seems to impose most of the
obligations on the upstream state and give most of the rights to the one downstream.” Id. at
410. However, at the same time, McCaffrey recognizes the importance of the specific circumstances governing a potentially harmful and unreasonable use of water resources. As
demonstrated, in Central Asia, the particular geologic, physical (infrastructure) and historic
characteristics of water-energy cooperation in Central Asia call for context-specific interpretation of the international water law principles of “no harm” and “equitable and reasonable
utilization.” Id. at 436.
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A similar conclusion applies regarding cooperation to achieve the “mutual benefits” of transboundary water management. As recognized by the
regional agreements governing water and energy cooperation in Central
Asia, the transboundary management of water and energy resources
presents “mutual benefits” for the watercourse states in the region.253 The
duty to cooperate under international water law enjoins the Central Asian
countries to work together to achieve these benefits, such as by pursuing
negotiations in good faith on the management of these resources. Hydropower generation to cover the Kyrgyz and Tajik winter energy deficit contradicts the “optimal utilization and adequate protection”254 of water
resources in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya River Basins. In this context,
Uzbekistan, together with the other lower riparian countries, must facilitate
thermal energy supply to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to minimize
water spillage in the winter. Uzbekistan’s unfounded opposition to energy
exchanges with the upper riparian countries, including its refusal to authorize transit of Turkmen power, is therefore at odds with international water
law.
Under international water law, the deep-rooted political tensions between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan cannot justify the absence of
cooperation between these states regarding the management of joint water
resources, and thus the absence of cooperation regarding electricity supply.
Indeed, according to Article 30 of the UN Watercourses Convention, states
shall fulfill their obligations of cooperation—including consultations and negotiations—even “in cases where there are serious obstacles to direct contacts between watercourse states,” such as those due to the breakdown of
diplomatic relations.255 Indirect cooperation procedures should be developed to overcome the barriers to direct relations. Uzbekistan, as a Contracting Party to the UN Watercourses Convention, can therefore not
invoke the breakdown of diplomatic relations with Tajikistan and its opposition to the Rogun project to refuse engaging in good faith negotiations on
efficient water-energy management in the region.
International water law also provides support to Kyrgyzstan’s and
Tajikistan’s claim that the lower riparian countries should participate in covering the costs of winter water storage, including lost opportunities to produce electricity from hydropower during the winter. This principle is
particularly important given Uzbekistan’s opposition to the idea of compen253.
See supra Section I.C on Mutual Benefits of Cooperation.
254.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 8, ¶ 1; see also Report of the
International Law Commission, supra note 234, at 97 (highlighting the necessity to cooperate
to achieve the “maximum possible benefits for all watercourse states”).
255.
L EB , supra note 17, at 80.
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sating upper riparian countries for the provision of water storage services.
According to Article 25, paragraph 2 of the UN Watercourses Convention,
“Unless otherwise agreed, watercourse States shall participate on an equitable basis in the construction and maintenance or defrayal of the costs of
such regulation works as they may have agreed to undertake.”256 Many
water cooperation agreements around the world recognize the commitment
by lower riparian countries to remunerate upper riparian countries for the
use of water storage facilities.257 In Central Asia, Kazakhstan agreed to compensate Kyrgyzstan for the water storage services in the rivers Chu and
Talas.258 Storage services can be remunerated on the basis of financial payments or through alternative barter contributions, such as the supply of
fossil energy in the winter to compensate for lower hydropower generation.
Interestingly, Uzbekistan, which opposes the payment of water storage services to Kyrgyzstan, remunerates Turkmenistan for pump stations located
in Turkmenistan but used for water supply to Uzbekistan.259 The lower
riparian countries, including Uzbekistan, have therefore in principle accepted the idea of compensating costs relating to the provision of water
storage and pumping services by neighboring countries.

3. Proposing Transboundary Water-Energy
Management Mechanisms
The post-Soviet experience highlights the challenges of barter-based
cooperation regarding water and energy management in Central Asia. To
avoid the obstacles relating to the seasonality of energy and water exchanges, the Central Asian countries can opt to provide water storage services and sell thermal or fossil energy under commercial terms. The
feasibility of this approach depends on the parties’ readiness to agree on
economically reasonable conditions governing these exchanges and on their
256.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 25, ¶ 2. On the financing of
maintenance works of hydro reservoirs and dams, see Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 72.
257.
For an overview of water agreements containing compensation clauses, see DINAR ET
AL., supra note 116, at 155.
258.
The Chu and Talas Rivers Agreement, supra note 187, at art. 3, provides that “The
Owning Party that possess water management facilities of intergovernmental status has the
right to compensation from the Utilizing Party that uses these facilities. The compensation
shall cover necessary expenses to ensure their reliable and safe operation.” See also DINAR ET
AL., supra note 116, at 155; World Bank, supra note 36, at 19; Mukhammadiev, supra note 31, at
238.
259.
Annual payments cover land rent and the cost of operation and maintenance of the
pump stations. See Kai Wegerich, Water Resources in Central Asia: Regional Stability or Patchy
Make-up?, 30 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 275, 282 (2011); Kai Wegerich, Hydro-hegemony in the Amu
Darya Basin, 10 WATER POL’Y (SUPPLEMENT 2) 71 (2008).
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ability to secure access to foreign currency.260 Independent from the level
of difficulty in reaching such agreements, international water law enjoins
the Central Asian countries to negotiate in good faith in order to overcome
the obstacles to optimal utilization of water resources in the region.261
To facilitate the negotiation of mutually acceptable conditions of energy
supply, the Central Asian countries could delegate to a joint commission or
body of international experts the task of providing independent advice on
the most sensitive questions of water and energy cooperation,262 including
the price, volume, and reliability of thermal energy and hydropower. The
creation of a common institutional framework governing water, hydropower, and thermal energy exchanges could advance regional integration
and the “optimal utilization” of shared water resources, within the meaning
of international water law.263
According to the UN Watercourses Convention, “Watercourse States
shall, at the request of any of them, enter into consultations concerning the
management of an international watercourse, which may include the establishment of a joint management mechanism.”264 International experience,
such as that of the Senegal River, demonstrates how the creation of independent bodies and a common institutional framework can overcome statecentric decisionmaking,265 contribute to equitable and rational water use,266
give confidence about the management of transboundary water sources, and
consequently avoid conflicts.267 The riparian states of the Senegal River
established one of the most elaborate and progressive regimes of interstate
cooperation in the water and energy sectors.268 This regime included a com260.
Fields et al., supra note 84.
261.
See U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 8, ¶ 1 (“Watercourse
States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit
and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.”).
262.
Mechanisms used to facilitate multilateral consultations and negotiations regarding
the management of shared water resource could include either a joint commission or dialogue
platforms. See L EB , supra note 17, at 140.
263.
U.N. Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, at art. 8, ¶ 1.
264.
Id. at art. 24, ¶ 1.
265.
“Institutionalization of cooperation can overcome State-centric water management
practices.” L EB , supra note 17, at 177. Given the close link between water and electricity
supply in Central Asia, the same reasoning can be applied to the management of electricity
resources.
266.
Brazil and Paraguay established joint (independent) mechanisms in order to improve the management of the Paraná River. See Treaty of Itaipú annex A, Braz.-Para., Apr.
26, 1973, 923 U.N.T.S. 92.
267.
See, BROWN WEISS, supra note 235, at 158–59.
268.
L EB , supra note 17, at 67; see also Abdul S. Ba & Makane M. Mbengue, Le Régime
Juridique du Fleuve Sénégal: Aspects du Droit des Cours d’eau dans un Context Régional [The
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mon institutional and regulatory regime governing the management of
transboundary water flows, joint investments in hydropower generation, and
a harmonized framework of tariffs and market rules for the supply of energy
in the region.269 The Senegal River provides a unique example of transboundary water-energy management that gradually achieved mutual benefits that characterize cooperation in this sector while avoiding the harm that
would result from state-centered water-energy policies.
Following this approach, joint investments in Central Asian electricity
supply infrastructure—particularly in hydropower plants—could be a further
step in the direction of reinforced water-energy cooperation. By jointly investing in new hydropower projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the lower
riparian countries would participate in the management of these projects.
Kazakhstan has in the past proposed to participate in the Kambarata project
in Kyrgyzstan, on the condition of having a Kazakh representative in the
board of the Toktogul hydropower plan.270 Kyrgyzstan allegedly rejected
this proposal, invoking the fact that “it does not wish to surrender its sovereign control over its facilities.”271 The Kyrgyz position can be explained by
the strategic regional importance of the Toktogul plant and its relevance to
the national economy.272 In Tajikistan, the Law on the Privatization of State
Property excludes the Nurek and Rogun sites from privatization.273 However, refusing to cooperate in joint electricity investments constrains solutions to the downstream risks associated with the construction of reservoirs
and hydropower plants. As examined above, the obligation to negotiate in
good faith under international water law requires states to compromise on
their position to the benefit of equitable and reasonable use of transboundary water resources.
Senegal River Legal Regime: Aspects of Waterway Law in a Regional Context], 12 AFR . Y.B.
INT’L L. 345 (2004); Margaret Vick, The Senegal River Basin: A Retrospective and Prospective
Look at the Legal Regime, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 211 (2006); Makane M. Mbengue, The Senegal
River Legal Regime and Its Contribution to the Development of the Law of International Watercourses in Africa, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FRESHWATER: THE MULTIPLE CHALLENGES 217 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 2013).
269.
See Energie – Les choix stratégiques de l’OMVS [Energy – The strategic choices of
the OMVS], ORGANISATION POUR LA MISE EN VALEUR DU FLEUVE SENEGAL [ORGANIZATION FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENEGAL RIVER], http://www.portail-omvs.org/domaines-dintervention/
secteurs-cle/energie-choix-strategiques-lomvs (last visited February 20, 2016).
270.
MOLLER, supra note 161, at 25; ICG, Central Asia, supra note 31, at 9; see also McKinney, supra note 38, at 216.
271.
Mukhammadiev, supra note 31, at 238.
272.
Id.
273.
Zakon Respubliki Tajikistana O Privatizatsii gosudarstvennoi sobstvennosti [Law
of the Republic of Tajikistan on the Privatization of State Property], No. 464, art. 9, May 17,
1997.
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The experience accumulated with the joint management of the Senegal
River demonstrates that the participation of all riparian countries in hydropower projects can be an efficient mechanism to enhance trust in the operation of this potentially harmful infrastructure.274 Downstream-upstream
cooperation in the development of hydropower projects can align the interests of the riparian countries regarding the management of shared water
resources. It can also set the foundations for the creation of a common
water-energy policy in the region.275Joint electricity investments—e.g., in
the form of a consortium between Uzbek, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik companies—could thus contribute to mitigating the political sensitivity of hydropower generation in Central Asia. Strategic partners in the region, in
particular Russia276 and China,277 could participate as co-investors or act as
external guarantors to the implementation of the agreements governing the
operation of these investments. Although this involvement could be geopolitically sensitive from the perspective of the Central Asian states concerned, the participation of external actors would contribute to the foreign
policy objective of political stability in Central Asia pursued by Russia and
China in Central Asia.278In its assessment of the Rogun project, the World
Bank confirms the benefits of an international consortium approach to the
implementation of the contentious hydropower project, including the improved management of downstream risks and the financing of the particularly high cost of the project.279
However, the creation of a hydropower consortium in Central Asia and
common operation of the transboundary water infrastructure will not be
sufficient to address the water-energy challenges in the region, in particular
taking into account the seasonality of hydropower generation. As demonstrated by the failure of the post-Soviet water-energy exchange system, the
274.
Makane M. Mbengue, A Model for African Shared Water Resources: The Senegal River
Legal System, 23 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 59, 61 (2014); see Kabine Komara,
Setting the Example of Cooperative Management of Transboundary Water Resources in West Africa,
WORLD BANK BLOGS (June 27, 2014), http://blogs.worldbank.org/nasikiliza/setting-example-co
operative-management-transboundary-water-resources-west-africa.
275.
See Energie, supra note 269.
276.
Russia—via the state-owned company Inter RAO UES—already participates in the
Kambarata project. See Chris Rickelton, Kyrgyzstan: Bishkek’s Hydropower Hopes Hinge on Putin’s Commitment, EURASIANET.ORG (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.eurasianet.org/node/66883.
277.
For a slightly outdated but still relevant analysis of China’s investment policy in
hydropower generation in Central Asia, see Sebastien Peyrouse, The Hydroelectric Sector in
Central Asia and the Growing Role of China, 5 CHINA & EURASIA F.Q. 131 (2007).
278.
See, e.g., MARLENE LAURELLE & SEBASTIEN PEYROUSE, THE CHINESE QUESTION IN CENTRAL
ASIA: DOMESTIC ORDER, SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE CHINESE FACTOR (2012).
279.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 20; see also Arifov & Arifova, supra note 34; Ismailov,
supra note 34.
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upper riparian countries must have clear guarantees regarding the supply of
compensatory winter energy. Joint investments in hydropower generation
will contribute to the protection of the lower riparian countries against the
risk of maximizing winter energy production, but this alone will not protect
the upper riparian countries against the risks of reduction or interruption of
thermal energy and fossil fuel supplies. External commitment structures
must be established to ensure the enforcement of winter supply arrangements. The following sections examine whether international climate law
and international energy law provide guidance regarding the achievement of
these integration objectives.

B. Transboundary Resources Management Under International
Climate Law
Cooperative resource management in Central Asia may also be framed
as a climate change mitigation and adaptation measure within the scope of
international climate law. As introduced above, by importing the Kyrgyz
and Tajik summer hydropower surplus, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan can reduce part of their thermal energy production and ultimately mitigate the
carbon emissions associated with this power generation. At the same time,
by optimizing the utilization of shared water resources, transboundary water
and energy management can improve the ability of the Central Asian countries to respond and adapt to climate change impacts on future water
availability.
In line with the general principle of cooperation in international environmental law,280 the international climate change regime promotes cooperation between states as a fundamental element of climate change mitigation
and adaptation.281 Given the global nature of climate change, the preamble
to the UNFCCC—to which all Central Asian countries are contracting parties—calls “for the widest possible cooperation by all countries.”282 In the
same vein, the 2010 Cancun agreements affirm that “[a]ll Parties should
cooperate, consistent with the principles of the Convention, through effective mechanisms, enhanced means and appropriate enabling environments.”283 More recently, at the 2015 Paris Conference of the Parties to the
UNFCCC, states agreed to “uphold and promote regional and international
280.
See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 196, at 175–76; SANDS, supra note 180, at 250.
281.
See ILA Res. 2/2014, supra note 20, at draft art. 8.
282.
UNFCCC, supra note 12, at pmbl., 1771 U.N.T.S. at 166.
283.
See Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Sixteenth Session, held in Cancun 29 Nov. to 10 Dec., 2010, Decision 1/CP.16, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, at 3 (Mar. 15, 2011), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/
eng/07a01.pdf [hereinafter Cancun Agreements].
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cooperation in order to mobilize stronger and more ambitious climate action
by all Parties and non-Party stakeholders” and requested “Parties to
strengthen regional cooperation on adaptation where appropriate.”284 According to the ILA Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, “States
shall cooperate with each other and competent international organizations
in good faith to address climate change and its adverse effects.”285 The principle of good faith, according to the ILA Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, commits States in negotiations on further legal instruments
on climate change and its adverse effects not to insist on their own position
without contemplating any modification of it. A State shall faithfully execute unilateral statements declarative of that State’s climate policies and
measures that generate legitimate expectations among other States.286
Taking into account the climate change mitigation and adaptation dimension of water-energy exchanges in Central Asia, the principle of good
faith cooperation requires states in the region to contemplate changes to
their position on water-energy management. Following the ILA Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, the principle of climate cooperation
would also support the faithful implementation by the Central Asian countries of their regional water-energy commitments. However, the following
limitations affect the direct and practical relevance of the principle of cooperation under international climate law.
First, cooperation, within the meaning of international climate law, primarily aims at the general objective of climate change mitigation as a “common concern of mankind.”287 The priority is to develop “an equitable and
effective climate change regime that is applicable to all, and to work towards
the multilaterally agreed global goal.”288 The focus on this global, multilateral objective has, to an important extent, taken attention away from the
necessity to offer international legal answers to regional barriers to cooperative climate change mitigation and adaptation.289
Second, the UNFCCC subjects its general cooperation requirement to
an important limitation: cooperation shall take into account the “specific
national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances”
284.
Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Adoption of the Paris Agreement: Proposal by the
President, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, at pmbl., ¶ 45 (Dec. 12, 2015), http://
unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf.
285.
ILA Res. 2/2014, supra note 20, at draft art. 8, ¶ 1.
286.
Id. at draft art. 9, ¶ 2.
287.
UNFCCC, supra note 12, at pmbl., 1771 U.N.T.S. at 165.
288.
ILA Res. 2/2014, supra note 20, at draft art. 5, ¶ 2.
289.
Most of the literature in the field of international climate law focuses on the development of a global regime for climate change mitigation and adaptation. See, e.g., SCHIELE,
supra note 157.
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of the contracting parties.290 National energy policies, such as energy independence policies, could thus justify states’ refusal to cooperate in the implementation of joint climate change mitigation and adaptation projects.
Third, international climate law falls short of directly imposing on developing countries (i.e., non-Annex I countries to the UNFCCC) specific
obligations to cooperate with other developing countries to achieve greenhouse gas emission reductions. Following the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” international climate law primarily regulates
cooperation between developed (Annex I) and developing (non-Annex I)
countries.291 The main objective of this cooperation is to help developed
countries to reach their quantified emission reduction obligations and to
implement mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries.292
According to Rajamani, “developing countries are responsible for co-operating in efforts to mitigate climate change”—but only in order to help developed countries to reach their emission reduction targets.293
The Central Asian countries are not included in Annex I to the
UNFCCC and thus qualify as developing countries within the meaning of
international climate law.294 In the absence of cooperation requirements between developing countries themselves, the Central Asian countries have no
obligations under international climate law to achieve the “low hanging
fruit” characterizing carbon reductions in a jointly managed electricity sector. Kazakhstan is one exception. Although it remains a non-Annex I country, Kazakhstan committed to quantified emission reduction obligations
under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol,295 making it eligible to participate in
290.
Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 10,
Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, annex A (entered into force Feb. 16, 2005) [hereinafter
Kyoto Protocol]; UNFCCC, supra note 11, at art. 4, ¶ 1, at 1771 U.N.T.S. at 170; Rocha
Loures et al., supra note 22, at 210, 219 (“[T]he UNFCCC fails to provide for a duty on
basin states to cooperate in the prevention and minimization of transboundary harm potentially arising from activities they undertake to mitigate or adapt to climate change. . . . [T]he
UNFCCC does not offer specific guidance on transboundary cooperation at the basin
level.”).
291.
See Lavanya Rajamani, The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility and
the Balance of Commitments Under the Climate Regime, 9 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL.
L. 120, 125–26 (2000).
292.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 290, at art. 12, ¶ 2 (“The purpose of the clean
development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to
assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments . . . .”).
293.
Rajamani, supra note 291, at 126–27.
294.
See UNFCCC, supra note 12, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 166, 171.
295.
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
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the cooperation mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol.296 On this basis, Kazakhstan could achieve part of its emission reduction commitment by replacing thermal energy production in the summer with imports of
hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and/or Tajikistan. Following the principle of
cooperation under international climate law, the upper riparian countries
would have a central role to play in helping Kazakhstan reach these emission
reduction targets. However, the upper riparian countries could easily derogate from this requirement by invoking national development priorities, including the development of hydropower generation for national energy
independence purposes. The objective of national energy independence that
characterizes the energy and water strategies in Central Asia can justify the
absence of climate cooperation—effectively undermining the contribution of
international climate law to transboundary water and energy management
in the area.
The largely non-binding formulation of the cooperation provisions of
the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol limits the potential contributions of
international climate law to water and energy cooperation in Central Asia.
Achieving cooperation will be largely left to the discretionary choices of the
Central Asian states.
However, this does not mean that international climate law has no role
to play in addressing the carbon costs resulting from the current state-centric approach to Central Asian electricity supply. Instead of imposing
mandatory cooperative requirements, the international climate regime—in
particular carbon finance—provides possible incentives to the Central Asian
states to reduce carbon emissions in the electricity sector.297 The new carbon finance mechanisms being developed under the international climate
regime provide an alternative source of financial support for transboundary
water and energy management in Central Asia.
In particular, developing countries can receive financial assistance from
developed countries to facilitate the implementation of “Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions”—i.e., voluntary actions (policies or projects)
taken by developing countries to reduce carbon emissions to levels below
on its eighth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012, Decision 1/CMP.8:
Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol Pursuant to its Article 3, Paragraph 9 (the Doha Amendment), annex 1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1, at 7 (Feb. 28, 2013) (where
Kazakhstan committed to a quantified emission reduction target of 95 percent by 2020 over
base year 1990); see also Karl Upston-Hooper & Jeff Swartz, Emissions Trading in Kazakhstan:
Challenges and Issues of Developing an Emissions Trading Scheme, 7 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV.
71 (2013).
296.
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 290, at art. 12, 2303 U.N.T.S. annex A at 224.
297.
World Bank, supra note 36, at 29, 52.
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those of “business as usual.”298 Moreover, developing countries can benefit
from financing from developed countries for the implementation of “National Adaptation Plans.”299 Although, as the name indicates, Nationally
Appropriate Mitigation Actions and National Adaptation Plans are nationally-centered,300 these mechanisms have a broad scope of application and do
not exclude regional programs and policies.301 States have flexibility in determining the emission reduction and adaptation actions that they propose
under the international climate regime. According to the UNFCCC Secretariat, policy-based Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions can include
the development of new energy security strategies that aim at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions in relation to business as usual.302 On this basis,
regional agreements in Central Asia303 aimed at partly replacing thermal
energy generation in the summer with imports of hydropower could be eligible for international support.
An essential requirement for the provision of international financial
support to Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions is the independent
Measurement, Reporting, and Verification of greenhouse gas emission reductions resulting from these programs.304 The Measurement, Reporting,
and Verification of carbon reductions generated by joint electricity management projects in Central Asia has the potential to address one of the main
obstacles affecting electricity cooperation in the region: the lack of compliance by the Central Asian countries with their legal and contractual obligations. Through independent Measurement, Reporting, and Verification, the
implementation of regional electricity cooperation programs under the inCancun Agreements, supra note 283, at item 52; SøREN E. LÜTKEN ET AL., UNFCCC
GUIDANCE FOR NAMA DESIGN: BUILDING ON COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 3 (2013), http://
unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/nama/application/pdf/
guidance_for_nama_design_(2013)_final.pdf.
299.
Cancun Agreements, supra note 283, at items 15–16.
300.
Id. at item 30 (inviting Parties “to facilitate and enhance national and regional
adaptation actions, in a manner that is country-driven”) (emphasis added).
301.
On the broad nature of the NAMA concept, see LÜTKEN ET AL., supra note 298, at
3–12, observing that “[t]he emerging NAMA regime makes it the prerogative of each developing country to interpret the NAMA Concept.” But see Rocha Loures et al., supra note 22,
at 209 (arguing that “NAPAs focus on local level adaptation strategies, rather than on longterm policy reform and enforcement mechanisms, even less so on joint or coordinated inter-state
action”).
302.
LÜTKEN ET AL., supra note 298, at 9.
303.
It must be noted that despite the opportunities that this scheme offers in terms of
access to international carbon finance, the Central Asian countries have not been very active
in the development of Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions. See UNFCCC, Country
Pages, PUBLIC NAMA, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/nama/items/7476.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
304.
See LÜTKEN ET AL., supra note 298, at 3–12.
298.

ET AL.,
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ternational climate architecture would contribute to improving the mutual
trust between the parties. It would reinforce the credibility of the regulatory
framework governing regional electricity exchanges by providing an external and neutral assessment of the parties’ compliance with their regional
electricity supply obligations.

C. Transboundary Resources Management Under International
Energy Law
Improving energy cooperation between states by building upon mutual
benefits and complementarities in the energy sector is the main objective
pursued by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)305—to which all Central
Asian countries are Contracting Parties. By participating in the ECT, states
provide guarantees of protection to foreign investments and commit to respect energy trade and transit disciplines. This, according to the Energy
Charter Secretariat, “represents a strategic opportunity for a state to signal
its readiness for improved international cooperation; stimulate investor interest in its energy sector; and build confidence and energy security with
and among its neighbouring states.”306 Cooperation under the ECT could,
in this view, be considered as a way for states to contribute to improved
relations with neighboring states. Moreover, by adhering to the ECT Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Matters, the Contracting Parties have committed to cooperate in the development and
implementation of energy efficiency policies.307
Although the ECT was initially directed at facilitating “mutually beneficial cooperation between East and West”308 (i.e., between the former Soviet Union and the European Union), it has evolved as a multilateral treaty
that applies equally to all its Contracting Parties, including to energy relations between “Eastern” (i.e. former Soviet Union) states themselves.309
Taking into account that all Central Asian countries have committed to the
trade, transit, investment, and energy-efficiency disciplines of the ECT, it
is necessary to examine to what extent these disciplines could contribute to
305.
ECT, supra note 14, at art. 2 (“establish[ing] a legal framework in order to promote
long-term co-operation in the energy field, based on complementarities and mutual
benefits”).
306.
See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND RELATED DOCUMENTS – A L EGAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL ENERGY COOPERATION 19–20 (2004).
307.
Id. at 16.
308.
Id. at 13.
309.
On the importance of a truly reciprocal application of the ECT to energy investments, see Anatole Boute, The Protection of Russian Investments in the EU Energy Market: A
Case in Support of Russia’s Ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty, 29 ICSID FOREIGN INV. L.J.
525 (2014).

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA202.txt

Spring 2016]

unknown

Seq: 55

18-MAY-16

The Water-Energy-Climate Nexus Under International Law

13:27

425

addressing the obstacles preventing water and energy cooperation in the
region.

1. Energy Efficiency Cooperation
The objective of the ECT Protocol on Energy Efficiency is to “provide
a framework for the development of cooperative and coordinated action” in
the field of energy efficiency.310 In principle, this Protocol is relevant to
regional cooperation in Central Asia, given the potential for energy and
carbon savings that the joint management of water and energy represents in
the region. Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Protocol requires a certain degree
of cooperation between the Central Asian countries in this field: “Contracting Parties shall co-operate and, as appropriate, assist each other in
developing and implementing energy efficiency policies, laws and
regulations.”311
However, in practice, the broad formulation of this provision strongly
reduces its binding nature and thus its relevance in addressing the obstacles
hindering electricity cooperation in Central Asia. According to Bradbrook,
“[a]dherence by states contracting parties [to the energy efficiency disciplines of the ECT] can be regarded as purely discretionary, and the obligations are no more than hortatory.”312

2. Cooperation in Energy Trade and Transit
In contrast to the Protocol on Energy Efficiency, the trade and transit
provisions of the ECT impose binding cooperation requirements on its
Contracting Parties. In accordance with the ECT energy transit regime,
Contracting Parties shall encourage relevant entities to cooperate in modernizing and developing transit infrastructure and facilitating the interconnection of transit networks.313 Moreover, Contracting Parties shall
encourage cooperation in designing measures to mitigate the effects of interruptions in the supply of energy.314 More specifically, the ECT requires
Contracting Parties to “take the necessary measures to facilitate Transit of
310.
See Energy Charter Treaty Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Matters, pmbl, art. 1, ¶ 1, Apr. 16, 1998, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
laws/italaw6101(34).pdf.
311.
Id. at art. 3, ¶ 1; see also id. annex, at 121 (establishing an “Illustrative and NonExhaustive List of Possible Areas of Cooperation Pursuant to Article 9 of the Protocol on
Energy Efficiency”).
312.
Bradbrook, supra note 24, at 254.
313.
ECT, supra note 14, at art. 7, ¶ 2.
314.
See generally Andrey A. Konoplyanik, Gas Transit in Eurasia: Transit Issues Between
Russia and the European Union and the Role of the Energy Charter, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 445 (2009).
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Energy Materials and Products consistent with the principle of freedom of
transit.”315
The ECT does not define the principle of freedom of transit. This
definition can be found in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT), taking into account that the trade regime of the ECT is based on
the rules and practice of the World Trade Organization (WTO).316 Only
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are part of the WTO, but all Central Asian countries have committed to the ECT and its transit disciplines.317 According to
the GATT, there “shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each
contracting party, via the routes most convenient for international transit,
for traffic in transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties.”318
Moreover, the GATT imposes an obligation of non-discrimination on the
basis of origin, destination or ownership of goods, and means of transportation.319 The ECT repeats the prohibition of discriminatory measures and
adds a positive component (“to facilitate transit”) to this passive requirement (prohibitions) under GATT.320 The ECT also regulates transit in case
of dispute on the terms and conditions of energy flows through the territory
of a third state.321 The main principle of the ECT transit dispute resolution
procedure is that the parties must avoid the interruption or reduction of
transit.322
The requirement “to facilitate transit”323 and refrain from interruption
or reduction of transit flows in situations of dispute is of great relevance for
water-energy-climate cooperation in Central Asia. In principle, it provides
strong legal arguments to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan against Uzbekistan’s
reluctance to authorize the transit of Turkmen electricity through its net315.
ECT, supra note 14, at art. 7, ¶ 1.
316.
The ECT’s trade provisions were initially based on the trading regime of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, https://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf [hereinafter GATT]. See ENERGY CHARTER
SECRETARIAT, supra note 306, at 15. For a recent and in-depth study of energy transit under the
ECT, the GATT and general international law, see Vitalyi Pogoretskyy, Freedom of Transit
and the Principles of Effective Right and Economic Cooperation: Can Systematic Interpretation of
GATT Article V Promote Energy Security and the Development of an International Gas Market?,
16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 313 (2013).
317.
ECT Participating Countries, 2080 U.N.T.S. 96–97.
318.
GATT, supra note 316, at art. V, § 2, 55 U.N.T.S. at 210.
319.
Id.
320.
On different interpretations of ECT article 7, paragraph 1, see Lothar Ehring &
Yulia Selivanova, Energy Transit, in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW –
WTO, NAFTA AND ENERGY CHARTER 83–84 (Yulia Selivanova ed., 2012).
321.
ECT, supra note 14, at art. 7, ¶ 6.
322.
See id.
323.
On this positive requirement, see Thomas Wälde & Andreas Gunst, International
Energy Trade and Access to Energy Networks, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 191, 213 (2002).
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work. As highlighted above, the transit of Turkmen power to the upper
riparian countries could enable the latter nations to reduce the unsustainable use of hydropower plants for electricity production in the winter.
The fact that the ECT transit regime was not used in practice324 to
address electricity transit disputes in Central Asia could be explained by the
gaps affecting the ECT transit dispute resolution regime, such as the requirement to exhaust all other remedies before conciliation may start.325
Nevertheless, confronted with the persistent refusal of Uzbekistan to authorize transit flows from Turkmenistan to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, this
issue could be brought for resolution under the general state-to-state (i.e.,
not the specific transit) dispute resolution procedure of the ECT.326 Although this mechanism remains untested, it provides Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan with a legal instrument to activate the international cooperation
obligations of the ECT.

3. Energy Investment Law
Investment protection is the fourth pillar of the ECT. As argued by the
Energy Charter Secretariat, the investment regime of the ECT “signal[s] [a
state’s] readiness for improved international cooperation” by facilitating foreign investments from partner countries.327 According to institutional economic theory, international investment protection reduces regulatory risks
and thereby stimulates the flow of capital and technology between countries, leading to reinforced international economic cooperation.328 Investment law enhances the credibility of regulatory frameworks and of
324.
It must be noted that states in general—not just in Central Asia—have been reluctant to make use of the ECT transit dispute resolution mechanism. However, in contrast to
Central Asia, in most other cases, the parties managed to find a political solution to the
transit dispute. See AZARIA, supra note 191, at 4, 21, 134 (“[D]espite these widespread effects
of interruptions of transit of energy via pipelines in violation of transit obligations, affected
states are often silent about international law and international responsibility.”). Azaria does
not provide an explanation for states’ reluctance to invoke the international responsibility of
transit states for breaches of transit obligations. Id.
325.
On the ECT transit dispute resolution procedure, see Ehring & Selivanova, supra
note 320, at 91–95.
326.
See ECT, supra note 14, at art. 27, 2080 U.N.T.S. at 106.
327.
See ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, supra note 306, at 13.
328.
See generally U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS IN ATTRACTING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, U.N. Sales No. E.09.II.D.20 (2009); Jeswald
Salacuse & Nicholas Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties and their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67 (2005); Jennifer Tobin & Susan RoseAckerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing Countries: The
Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties (Yale Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 293, 2005), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557121.
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government commitments by protecting investors against illegitimate political interference with their investments.329 This function is particularly relevant for water-energy-climate cooperation in Central Asia: as introduced in
Section II.A, supra, a major obstacle to cooperation in the region relates to
the lack of enforcement by states of the agreements governing inter-state
water and energy exchanges. Involving foreign investments in the construction and operation of export-oriented power plants could contribute to the
implementation of the regional energy and water agreements in Central
Asia.330
More specifically, the export of electricity to neighboring power markets can constitute an important part of the business case for new power
plants in Central Asia. Exporting electricity can be a way for investors to
mitigate the investment risk relating to the limited solvency of national
electric utilities—entities that are currently exposed to high levels of debt
and non-payment by domestic energy consumers.331 “To ensure access to
neighboring markets, foreign investors could require clear export and import guarantees from the countries concerned.”332 In particular, foreign investors in power generation could conclude investment agreements with the
host country where the investment is made.333 Moreover, the operators of
hydropower plants could conclude long term Power Purchase Agreements
(PPAs) with the importing states or with private parties in the importing
states.334 Investors in thermal power plants could conclude long-term agreements for the supply of fossil energy to these installations. As highlighted
by the Petrobart investment arbitration decision, energy contracts—not only
energy infrastructure—are protected as “investments” under the investment
regime of the ECT.335 In the Energyrynok investment arbitration, the tribunal concluded that an Agreement on the Parallel Operation of Energy Systems “in itself can evidence an Investment” within the meaning of the
ECT.336 Following this interpretation, a PPA between the operator of a
329.
See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPHE SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 119 (2012).
330.
See Boute, supra note 82.
331.
See Artur Kochnakyan et al., World Bank, Tajikistan: Financial Assessment of Barki
Tojik, World Bank Rep. No. 83696 (Oct. 2013).
332.
Boute, supra note 82, at 30–32.
333.
Id.
334.
Id. at 48.
335.
Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, No. 126/2003, at 68–72 (Stockholm Chamber
of Commerce, 2005) (recognizing that the sale of goods can qualify as an “investment” protected under international investment arbitration).
336.
State Enterprise ‘Energorynok’ (Ukr. v. The Republic of Mold.), No. SCC Arbitration V (2012/175), ¶ 81 (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, 2015). The tribunal determined that the Agreement on the Parallel Operation of Energy Systems (APO) is

\\jciprod01\productn\M\MEA\5-2\MEA202.txt

Spring 2016]

unknown

Seq: 59

The Water-Energy-Climate Nexus Under International Law

18-MAY-16

13:27

429

power plant and an importing state could be considered an “investment” in
the territory of the importing state. Similarly, a PPA between the exporting
state and a private company located in a third country could be considered
an “investment” in the territory of the exporting state.
To ensure state compliance with the sensitive elements of water-energy
exchanges, the investment agreements and PPAs must regulate as clearly as
possible the volume, price, and time (seasonality and peak-base load) aspects governing the export of hydro and thermal power.337 Additionally, to
overcome the energy transit barrier highlighted above, the agreements must
cover non-discriminatory access to the interconnection capacity, nomination
at the border, balancing requirements, and contribution to system frequency. Fossil fuel supply contracts between thermal capacity investors and
lower riparian countries must establish a clear delivery regime for the transfer of fossil fuels.
Clear commitments on the regulatory and contractual regime governing
energy exports and imports in Central Asia can be enforced through international arbitration.338 Depending on the harm caused to the investor, the
breach of a contractual agreement entered into by a state can amount to a
violation of the “umbrella clause” of the ECT provided that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party.”339
Moreover, foreign investors can invoke the frustration of the “reasonable
and legitimate expectations” that governed their investment decisions in the
an agreement relating to the transportation, distribution and supply of Energy
Materials and Products by way of transmission and distribution grids (meeting the
requirement in ECT Understandings IV (2)(iii)) . . . . The Energy Material/
Product was transmitted/distributed in Moldova and added economic value to
Moldova. That the APO was signed by Ministries, and that two state entities,
NCC and Moldenergo (neither being party to the APO), were designated . . . to
carry out the performance of the technical and operational functions under the
APO, does not change the characterization of the APO. The APO confers to the
Party/Ministry a right to undertake an economic activity concerning the transit of
electricity in the host State; that activity, in the Tribunal’s view, constitutes an
Investment according to the ECT.
Id. However, in casu, the Tribunal ruled that the claimant did not have a sufficient role in the
economic activity carried out and therefore decided that it lacked jurisdiction over the case.
Id.
337.
See Fields et al., supra note 84, at 29; Erik J. Woodhouse, The Obsolescing Bargain
Redux? Foreign Investment in the Electric Power Sector in Developing Countries, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL . 121, 130 (2005–2006) (discussing the importance, and at the same time limits, of
PPAs for investments in power production).
338.
Boute, supra note 82, at 30–32.
339.
ECT, supra note 14, at art. 10, ¶ 1.
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export-oriented power plants.340 The right of foreign investors to “independently enforce the contractually agreed export-import regime could contribute to the de-politicization of regional electricity cooperation.”341 Energy
investment law—as an “externally supported commitment device”342—could
help enforce energy and water supply commitments and so improve trust
between the Central Asian countries.343
The conclusion of long-term PPAs with foreign partners and the protection of these agreements under investment law could indirectly contribute to improving the credibility of water management arrangements in the
region. In particular, to honor long-term PPAs covering the output of hydropower plants in the summer, the upper riparian countries will have to
340.
See Anatole Boute, Challenging the Re-Regulation of Liberalized Electricity Prices Under
Investment Arbitration, 32 ENERGY L.J. 497, 519 (2011). For a discussion of the protection that
international investment law and in particular the fair and equitable treatment standard offers to foreign investments in the electricity sector, see id. at 497–539. See generally Anatole
Boute, Combating Climate Change through Investment Arbitration, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 613
(2012).
341.
Boute, supra note 82, at 30–32.
342.
Emma Aisbett, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation Versus Causation 5 (Mar. 15, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Munich
University Library, Munich Personal RePEc Archive Paper No. 2255), http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/2255/1/MPRA_paper_ 2255.pdf.
343.
This approach is not novel. The Loan Agreement between Uzbekistan and the
Asian Development Bank for the financing of the Talimarjan power project stipulates that
Uzbekistan “shall ensure that Uzbekenergo [the vertically integrated electricity supplier, also
in charge of regulating the Uzbek electricity sector] enters into a sustainable power trade
framework with neighboring countries, and exports and imports power based on sound commercial arrangements.” Loan Agreement (Special Operations) (Talimarjan Power Project) 19,
Uzb.-Asian Dev. Bank, May 1, 2010, http://www.adb.org/projects/documents/loan-agreement-talimarjan-power-project-between-republic-uzbekistan-and-asian-d-0. In the same vein,
the agreements between Russia and Kyrgyzstan governing the construction and exploitation
of the Kambaratin GES-1 and the Verkhne-Naryn hydropower plants and the agreements
between Russia and Tajikistan concerning the exploitation of the Sangtuda hydropower plant
contain an explicit commitment by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to guarantee the export of the
electricity produced. These agreements identify the Russian investors (INTER RAO and
Rushydro) that are tasked with the implementation of these projects—indirectly conferring
rights to these companies. See Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoi Federatsii i
Pravitel’stvom Kirgizskoi Respubliki o Stroitel’stve i Ekspluatatsii Verkhne-Narynskogo kaskada gidroelektrostantsii [Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation
and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Construction and Operation of the
Upper Naryn Cascade of Hydropower Plants], Sept. 20, 2012, http://narynhydro.kg/
soglashenie.html; Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel’stvom Rossiiskoi Federatsii i Pravitel’stvom
Kirgizskoi Respubliki o Stroitel’stve i Ekspluatatsii Kambaratinskoi GES-1 [Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Construction of Kambarata-1], Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.conventions.ru/
view_base.php?id=1425.
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maintain the upstream reservoir at sufficient levels during the winter.344
Taking into account that PPAs in theory fall within the scope of application
of investment treaties, private foreign investors could seek to enforce the
implementation of this water and energy regime before investment
arbitration.

V. POSITIVE REGIME INTERACTION AND INTEGRATED WATERENERGY-CLIMATE LAW
As illustrated by the case of Central Asia, the interrelated nature of
water and energy security requires an integrated approach to the regulation
of these sectors. However, the fields of international energy and water law
have been developed and studied in isolation from each other. The international regulation of energy security, such as under the Energy Charter
Treaty, does not recognize the negative impact that national energy independence policies can have on the sustainability of water management.
Moreover, with the exception of hydropower generation, the international
regulation of transboundary water utilization does not explicitly address
states’ concern for energy security. International climate law promotes more
sustainable water uses—as a climate adaptation measure—and stimulates the
development of more efficient energy production—as a climate mitigation
measure. However, international climate law fails to recognize how energy
and water uses relate to each other in the context of climate change mitigation and adaptation. The fragmented nature of the international regime
governing water, energy, and climate security must be clearly understood in
order to avoid regulatory choices in one field of law that would conflict with
the objectives pursued by another field of law. The case of Central Asia
highlights the threat that conflicting uses of energy and water resources
represent for water-energy-climate security and even for peace in the
region.
At the same time, the case of Central Asia illustrates the possible “productive friction between regimes”345 in international law. The general principles of international law—together with the specific disciplines of
international water, energy, and climate law—can mutually reinforce each
other in addressing the water-energy-climate security challenges of the
twenty-first century.
Applied to Central Asia, the general principles of international law provide crucial guidance in resolving water and energy disputes in the region.
Under the principle of sovereignty over natural resources, the upper ripa344.
345.

See Pöyry Energy Ltd., supra note 38, at 321–22.
Young, supra note 25, at 1.
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rian countries cannot be prevented from developing their hydropower capacity.346 Similarly, the lower riparian countries cannot be forced to exploit
and export their fossil resources to compensate the winter energy deficit of
the upper riparian countries. However, the principle of sovereignty over
natural resources is not absolute. According to the principle of good neighborliness,347 the upper riparian countries must take into account the interests of and avoid harm to the lower riparian countries. Similarly, the
principle of good neighborliness requires the lower riparian countries to
assist the upper riparian countries, or at least not deliberately harm their
interests by blocking the transit of thermal power from third countries.
Taking into account the possibly disastrous consequences that could result from increased water scarcity in the context of climate change, the parties must cooperate in good faith to achieve water and energy security in a
mutually reinforceable way. In practice, this means that Uzbekistan must be
ready to compromise on its radical opposition to large hydropower projects
and its refusal to facilitate fossil exchanges with the upper riparian countries. Moreover, the upper riparian countries must be ready to consider the
possibility of implementing large hydropower projects in collaboration with
the lower riparian countries or external strategic partners if this can contribute to avoiding the risk that maximization of winter hydropower generation
represents for the lower riparian countries.
International water law reinforces these cooperation requirements by
insisting on the “community of interests” and maximum benefits for the
riparian states, in connection with the optimization of water use.348 These
notions provide strong support for the regional management of water resources. As argued in this Article, the optimal utilization of water resources
in Central Asia does not only depend on actions by the upper riparian countries in control of the transboundary water flows. The lower riparian countries also have a responsibility in ensuring the sustainable management of
water resources. By securing supplies of thermal power or fossil energy to
the upper riparian countries at affordable conditions, the lower riparian
countries can help reduce the necessity of winter hydropower generation
and therein contribute to the equitable and reasonable use of water in the
region.

346.
See L EB , supra note 17, at 142.
347.
G.A. Res. 34/99, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/99 (Dec. 14, 1979), http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/34/a34res99.pdf.
348.
Territorial Jurisdiction of Int’l Comm’n of River Oder (U.K. v. Pol.), Judgment,
1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 27 (Sept. 10); Gabčı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 41, ¶ 85 (Sept. 25).
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The principles of international water law remain relatively broad and
thus require further specification and operationalization in regional water
management agreements. Moreover, specific enforcement measures are crucial to ensuring compliance with the principles of international water law.
In this respect, international experience in the management of shared water
resources presents interesting examples of effective regional cooperation
models. Although it would be unrealistic to advocate the transplant in Central Asia of the Senegal River approach—one of the most elaborate water
cooperation regimes349—this experience illustrates the type of compromises
(e.g., joint investments in hydropower) that the Central Asian countries
could make in order to improve the management of the regional water and
energy resources. However, even if fully transplanted in Central Asia, the
Senegal River approach to regional water integration would not be sufficient to secure sustainable water management in the region. Additional
mechanisms are needed to ensure the supply of energy from the lower to
the upper riparian countries to compensate for water storage in the winter.
International climate and energy law can help enforce water-energy exchange mechanisms and thereby improve trust between the parties. In particular, the independent Measurement, Reporting, and Verification of
regional emission reductions resulting from the joint management of water
and energy resources could assist the countries in ensuring compliance with
their respective commitments. Moreover, the protection of energy contracts
(i.e., investment agreements, PPAs, and fossil fuel contracts) under the
ECT could provide an external commitment guarantee by involving private
investors in the regional cooperation framework.
In contrast to international water law, the formulation of the principle
of cooperation under international energy and climate law provides very
little support to the development of joint management mechanisms to overcome national-centered policies. The UNFCCC, for instance, explicitly
subordinates regional cooperation to national development priorities—effectively justifying energy independence policies and thus undermining the
transboundary management of resources. The national exception to cooperation under international energy and climate law differs from the focus on
the “community of interests” and the optimization of shared resources
under international water law. Following the development of international
water law, international energy and climate law could be improved by integrating stronger cooperation requirements—in particular by regarding the
transboundary and integrated management of resources.

349.

L EB , supra note 17, at 67.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the mutual benefits of cooperation in Central Asia and the official support that the states have given to this option in regional agreements,
governments are reluctant to rely on their neighbors for their water and
energy security. The strategic objective of national self-sufficiency imposes
a high energy, social, economic, and environmental cost on the region. Political tensions—such as those relating to the construction of large hydropower plants, the cost of energy and water services, and the general lack of
trust between the parties—exacerbate the technical difficulties in developing
a functioning framework for water-energy cooperation. External legal
mechanisms are needed to overcome the current political obstacles to cooperation and guide the Central Asian parties in the development of transboundary management mechanisms.
Given the water-energy interdependence in the region, Central Asia
provides a unique case study to assess the effectiveness of international law
in contributing to the sustainable management of transboundary resources.
An integrated analysis of the water-energy-climate nexus under international law highlights the diverging approaches to the regulation of transboundary cooperation in these distinct fields. Taking into account the
necessity to achieve water and energy security in a mutually reinforceable
way in the context of climate change, it is essential to ensure the consistency and complementarity of the international regimes governing these
interrelated challenges.

